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ABSTRACT
Transnational technical standard-setting has grown in prominence in
recent years. The World Trade Organization (WTO) requires the use of
international standards but adopts a deferential approach towards
international standards. However, practice shows that several international
standards are promulgated through opaque and exclusionary processes. In
line with this observation, in its recent US—Tuna II ruling, the Appellate
Body adopted a more critical stance regarding international standards and
the processes that lead to their adoption. Against this backdrop, this article
focuses on an analysis of the properties and mechanics of international
standard-setting processes within the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), discussing procedural and substantive guarantees
regarding transparency, openness, deliberation and participation. As the
WTO becomes the de facto arbiter of the legitimacy of international
standards, much needed institutional reform in international standardsetting is bound to occur. Arguably, this is bringing a paradigm shift in
standardization practices and introduces “global standard-setting 2.0.”
Such trend is in line with emerging demands for a more inclusive global legal
order.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

International standards play an increasingly conspicuous role in WTO
agreements.1 It is telling that the preamble of the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT), one of the WTO-covered agreements,2 commences
with the assumption that international standards improve efficiency of
production and facilitate the conduct of international trade.3 Therefore, they
should be adhered to for all practical purposes. The Agreement on Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) includes statements along similar lines.4

1. WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, at 9 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement or WTO Agreement].
2. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, annex 1A WTO Agreement, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868
U.N.T.S. 120, at 5 [hereinafter TBT].
3. Id.; see also Peter Swann et al., Standards and Trade Performance: the UK Experience, 106
ECON. J. 1297, 1297–313 (1996).
4. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, annex 1A WTO
Agreement, Ap. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493, at 71–83 [hereinafter SPS].
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Standards are a form of codified technical knowledge that enables the
development of products and processes. While voluntary, standards
regularize and constrain behavior (regulative function), lend a taken-forgranted quality to certain technologies and modi operandi (cognitive
function), and favor cooperative strategies over adversarial ones (normative
function).5 The last function in particular can have a long-lasting beneficial
effect because standardization creates an infrastructure that, once created,
gives parties an incentive to use it, resulting in increased cooperation and
enabling users to take full advantage of the network effects of
standardization.6 In addition, first mover advantages in standardization7 are
substantial incentives for firms to innovate.8 Absent some form of standardsetting, technological progress would miss an important instrument for
benchmarking and capitalizing on advances in the field of technology. In that
sense, standards are constitutive of markets9 and a decisive instrument for
economic growth.10
On the other hand, standards can also impede trade. This is because they
reflect preferences and values of a given populace that may—and often do—
diverge, thereby inflating compliance costs for companies.11 If developed
internationally, substantial gains can be made through the diminution of such
costs and by addressing network externalities and information
asymmetries.12 As a result, international standardization has become the
preferred layer of regulatory action, both government and private driven.13
5. Christel Lane, The Social Regulation of Inter-Firm Relations in Britain and Germany: Market
Rules, Legal Norms and Technical Standards, 21 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 197, 197 (1997).
6. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP.
93, 109 (1994).
7. Art. 1.1 of the ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004 [hereinafter The Guide] defines standardization as the
“activity of establishing, with regard to actual or potential problems, provisions for common and repeated
use, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context. Note 1: in particular,
the activity consists of the processes of formulating, issuing, and implementing standards.”
8. Again, and more generally, if we consider standardization as infrastructure, it can promote but
also hamper innovation. See also Daron Acemoglu et al., Competing Engines of Growth: Innovation and
Standardization, 147 J. ECON. THEORY 570, 573 (2012).
9. Harm Schepel, THE CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE – PRODUCT STANDARDS IN THE
REGULATION OF INTEGRATING MARKETS (2005).
10. Knut Blind & Andre Jungmittag, The Impact of Patents and Standards on Macroeconomic
Growth: A Panel Approach Covering Four Countries and 12 Sectors, 29 J. PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS 51,
51 (2008).
11. Robert W. Staiger & Alan O. Sykes, International Trade, National Treatment and Domestic
Regulation, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 149, 152 (2011).
12. See WTO, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2005 at xxvi-xvii (2005).
13. Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Setting International Standards – Technological Rationality or
Primacy of Power?, 56 WORLD POL. 1, 7 (2003); Kristina Tamm Hallström, ORGANIZING
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION – ISO AND THE IASC IN QUEST OF AUTHORITY (2004).
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Globalization vindicates this choice; as the importance of global supply
chains increases, international standards grow equally in prominence.14
The cost of this seemingly irreversible shift of locus of standardization
depends on the level of sophistication of the relevant firms. The consumer,
on the other hand, is a net winner due to this development; economic theory
would suggest that an international standard reduces consumer costs as
information becomes more readily available and prices become more readily
comparable.15
The WTO, generally reluctant to use non-WTO material to assess the
WTO compliance of a given Member,16 is more lenient when the output of
international standard-setting bodies (ISSBs) is at stake. Much of previous
WTO case law17 exemplifies this deferential approach. In both cases, nonconsensual international standards were considered relevant benchmarks for
assessing WTO compatibility of national measures. This is quite
extraordinary for a consensus-driven organization like the WTO, whereby
the legacy of consensus is a major hallmark of the multilateral trading
system.
The texts of the SPS and TBT, respectively, only partially vindicate
such unconditional deference to ISSBs. More recently, in US—Tuna II, the
Appellate Body has given signs of a more critical approach vis-à-vis nonWTO standards as relevant benchmarks for assessing compliance with WTO
law.18 The Appellate Body ruled that no automatic and thus mechanical
comparison should be made between the relevant international standard and
the measure at issue in a WTO dispute. Rather, before this comparison takes
place, an examination of the procedural and substantive guarantees of the
standard-setter at issue is opportune if its output is to play a decisive role in
finding a violation of WTO law.
14. World Economic Forum (WEF), THE GLOBAL ENABLING TRADE REPORT 2012 – REDUCING
SUPPLY CHAIN BARRIERS (2012).
15. See WTO, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2012, 136 (2012).
16. See Panagiotis Delimatsis, The Fragmentation of International Trade Law, 45 J. WORLD
TRADE 87,102–03 (2011).
17. See generally Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R & WTO Doc. WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998)
[hereinafter EC – Hormones]; Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of
Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R (Sep. 26, 2002) [hereinafter EC – Sardines]. Nowadays, mention is
exclusively made of the European Union and no longer of the European Community, as a result of the
entry of the Treaty of Lisbon into force. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union,
art. 1(3), 7 June 2016 [hereinafter TEU].
18. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing
and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R (June 13, 2012) [hereinafter US –
Tuna II].
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This judicial finding points to the penumbra of processes used within
ISSBs. Admittedly, our knowledge about the mechanics of international
standard-setting is quite limited. Hearsay about lack of representation and
inclusiveness is not uncommon, whereas anecdotal evidence about power
politics and strategic behavior makes headlines from time to time. More
recently, the shortcomings of international standardization processes became
a central issue in the non-agricultural market access (NAMA) negotiations
within the WTO.19
Against this backdrop, a closer analysis of the properties of
international standard-setting is apposite and timely. Recognition of any rule
presupposes contestation, which, in turn, inevitably inquires into how
standards are adopted.20 Taking as an example the International Organization
for Standardization (ISO), the most important standard-setting body
globally, this article analyzes the procedural and substantive guarantees
regarding transparency, openness, deliberation, and participation within
international standard-setting processes. This exercise aims to identify the
processes that ensure that international standards adopted in these fora are in
line with basic tenets of due process.
A central argument of this article is that attributing automatic legal force
in the WTO to international standards developed elsewhere is untenable.
Such an approach is contrary to contemporary demands for more
transparency and due process within global governance institutions
generally, and openness in international standard-setting in particular.21
More importantly, we deploy the analysis on ISO to submit that, in times of
increased legalization of international rule-making at the transnational level,
an examination of the necessary guarantees (or a “democratic minimum”)22
with which an international standard-setter would need to comply is
indispensable.
At this juncture, the role and influence of the WTO as a potential driver
for a new approach in international standard-setting, or “standard-setting

19. See WTO, Negotiating Group on Market Access, ‘Market Access for Non-Agricultural
Products – International Standards in Support of Trade and Economic Development: Strengthening the
Contribution of the Committee Decision’, WTO Doc. TN/MA/W/141 (March 29, 2011) (referring to the
TBT Committee Decision relating to the development of international standards, see infra, Section II).
20. See Harm Schepel, Rules of Recognition: A Legal Constructivist Approach to Transnational
Private Regulation, in REGULATORY HYBRIDIZATION IN THE TRANSNATIONAL SPHERE 189, 197 (Paulius
Jurčys et al. eds., 2013).
21. See Armin von Bogdandy, The European Lesson for International Democracy: The
Significance of Articles 9–12 EU Treaty for International Organizations, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 315, 331
(2012).
22. See Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods,
108 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 16 (2014).
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2.0,” will also form part of the analysis that the article offers. Section II
describes the position of international standards in the TBT by reference to
the current legal framework and case law, while Section III presents an
account of ISO standard-setting processes. A critical assessment of standardsetting practices within ISO follows in Section IV.
II.

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND THE TBT

The multilateral trading system was initially based on a negative
integration contractual approach; non-discrimination has been the
overarching principle of the system and the linchpin of this approach,
allowing sufficient leeway for domestic regulatory authorities to unilaterally
define the set of policies they would want to adopt. Thus, international
standards and, a fortiori, the bodies that promulgate them were outside the
reach of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which meant
that the international standardization regime and the multilateral trading
regime would pave their own, distinct ways of exerting influence over
commercial transactions.23
The advent of the WTO would not change much with respect to the lack
of any capacity of the trading system to create technical standards itself.
However, the level of integration sought regarding non-tariff barriers would
change, with greater emphasis on regulations of technical nature and
measures purportedly taken to protect public health or safety.24 Both the TBT
and the SPS would now clearly strive for regulatory convergence using
international standards as benchmarks regarding the direction such
convergence should take.25 Standards created in ISSBs, such as ISO, the
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), or the Codex
Alimentarius, were invariably regarded as authoritative expressions of
international technical consensus. They could be used as proxies that would
allow for properly striking the balance in any given case between
protectionist-driven domestic regulations and the well-meant protection of
non-economic, public policy objectives. Thus, non-WTO material—i.e.,
23. It is only in the Tokyo Round in the mid-70s that the issue of technical barriers to trade and the
role that international standards could play was discussed, leading to a plurilateral agreement. See ALAN
O. SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONALLY INTEGRATED GOODS MARKETS, 57–77 (1995).
24. See Jacqueline Peel, A GMO by Any Other Name . . . Might Be an SPS Risk!: Implications of
Expanding the Scope of the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L.
1008, 1013 (2007).
25. See Gabrielle Marceau & Joel P. Trachtman, The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, The
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A
Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 811,
886–93 (2002).

DELIMATSIS FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

4/11/2018 7:57 PM

GLOBAL STANDARD-SETTING 2.0

279

international standards—would play the role of useful heuristic devices in
this new area of growing positive integration within the WTO. The absence
of a standard-setting capacity by the TBT and SPS committees, or the WTO
more generally, warranted the introduction of non-WTO material by
reference.
A. Technical Regulations and (International) Standards under the TBT
The TBT distinguishes between two types of measures: technical
regulations and standards.26 The difference between the two lies in the degree
of compliance: whereas compliance is mandatory for technical regulations,
it is only voluntary in the case of standards. Still, some overlap regarding the
scope of the two categories is evident by reading the definitions in the TBT
Agreement; they both cover labeling requirements and production and
process methods (PPMs). An additional difference between technical
regulations and standards relates to the source of the measure: whereas
technical regulations would typically be adopted by a governmental body
and thus be a State measure, standards are typically issued by private or semiprivate SSBs. Standards can later become technical regulations (or part
thereof) if adopted or used as a basis for legislative acts by the State.
In practice, the distinction between the two is not always
straightforward and can confuse regulators, companies, and courts alike.
Recently, in US—Tuna II, the WTO adjudicating bodies blurred the
distinction between the two types of TBT measures by arguing that a
voluntary dolphin-safe labeling scheme for tuna products access (which is
subject to certain criteria as to how the tuna was harvested) is a technical
regulation and not a standard, although access to the US market for tuna was
available.27
Article 2.4 of the TBT is the key provision when examining the relation
between international standards and the TBT. Pursuant to this provision,
relevant international standards or relevant parts thereof (when they exist or
are about to be adopted) must be used as a basis for domestic technical
regulations unless they are ineffective means for meeting the public policy
objectives. International standards are used as a basis when they are the

26. TBT, supra note 2, at annex 1. On the definition of technical regulation in annex 1.1, see
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing
of Seal Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R & WTO Doc. WT/DS401/AB/R (May 22, 2014), ¶ 5.8ff
[hereinafter EC – Seal Products].
27. See also Panagiotis Delimatsis, “Relevant International Standards” and “Recognized
Standardisation Bodies” under the TBT Agreement, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDISATION 104, 119 (Panagiotis Delimatsis ed., 2015).
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principal constituent or fundamental principle for the purpose of enacting the
technical regulation at stake. Furthermore, there is no restriction with respect
to time. Hence, international standards created before the entry of the TBT
into force can also be relevant if the state of the art has not changed in the
meantime with the adoption of a new international standard.28 In other words,
previously voluntary standards suddenly become mandatory benchmarks for
domestic technical regulations.29
Article 2.5 incorporates a presumption of TBT compatibility for those
technical regulations that are in accordance with relevant international
standards and pursue a legitimate objective. The rationale behind this “safe
haven” is that voluntary international standards incorporate international
preferences and constitute artifacts of widely accepted technical superiority.
In addition, Article 2.9 imposes additional notification requirements in case
relevant international standards are not used.
Hence, the tilt toward the use of relevant international standards
manifests in a variety of ways: first, a requirement that members use relevant
international standards in a positive manner and the creation of a rebuttable
presumption of consistency as an extra “carrot”; second, the imposition of
additional burdensome conditions that members need to abide by if they
disregard or decide not to use international standards.
As a consequence of TBT’s unequivocal preference, then, in those areas
where international standards exist, they become the reference point and de
facto mandatory normative technical material to be used by WTO Members.
As a result, a mass of documents of at best uncertain legal normativity is
transformed into international obligations equivalent to treaty text.30 As
noted earlier, this is even more striking if one considers the meticulous
character of the analysis that the WTO adjudicating bodies typically
undertake when attempting to classify particular legal texts under one of the
subparagraphs of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT).
For such an unambiguous endorsement of legal material generated
outside the WTO, the TBT Agreement is quite cryptic with respect to what
28. EC – Sardines, ¶ 205.
29. This changed forever the way international standards, particularly those created within ISO,
were perceived by States; ISSBs grew in salience, but also came under States’ and scholars’ spotlights,
very quickly. See Winton Higgins & Kristina Tamm Hallström, Standardization, Globalization and
Rationalities of Government, 14 ORGANIZATION 685, 696 (2007).
30. See Robert Howse, A New Device for Creating International Legal Normativity: The WTO
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement and “International Standards”, in CONSTITUTIONALISM,
MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 383, 384 (Christian Joerges
& Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2011).
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constitutes a relevant international standard.31 Only a generic definition of
“standard” is available in the TBT:
Document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and
repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related
processes and production methods, with which compliance is not
mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology,
symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a
product, process or production method.32

Importantly, the explanatory note that follows suggests that, whereas
standards adopted by the “international standardization community” are
based on consensus, the TBT also covers documents that are not based on
consensus.33
The definition of a standard in the ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004 is,34 for all
practical purposes, similar to the one in the TBT, albeit with important
nuances:
[D]ocument, established by consensus and approved by a recognized
body, that provides for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or
characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of
the optimum degree of order in a given context. Note: Standards should
be based on the consolidated results of science, technology and
experience, and aimed at the promotion of optimum community benefits.35

As one can infer, a crucial difference between the two definitions
provided above is the role of consensus when considering whether a
particular technical content could be deemed a standard.
B. Standardizing Organizations and “Recognized” Bodies
The Guide further considers as international those standards that are
adopted by an international standardizing/standards organization and made

31. The lack of a definition of what an international standard is may also be due to the fundamental
disagreement between the EU and the US as to what an international standard and an international
standard-setting body stand for. This same question lies at the heart of the negotiations for a Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). See CEN/CENELEC Position Paper on EU-US Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – Technical Barriers to Trade, Initial EU Position Paper (Sept.
2013).
32. TBT, supra note 2, at 132 (emphasis added).
33. Id. (“For the purpose of this Agreement standards are defined as voluntary and technical
regulations as mandatory documents. Standards prepared by the international standardization community
are based on consensus. This Agreement covers also documents that are not based on consensus.”)
34. The Guide is an update of ISO/IEC Guide 2:1991 on which the TBT is based. See note 7.
35. See The Guide, supra note 7, at 38 (emphasis added).
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available to the public.36 In turn, an international standardizing organization
is defined in the Guide as “the organization” (that is, the body that is based
in the membership of other bodies or individuals and has an “established
constitution and its own administration”) whose membership is open to the
relevant national body from every country.37 The TBT defines international
bodies in an open-ended manner: international body is the body or system
whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of all WTO Members. In
other words, when examining the international nature of a standard, attention
should center on the traits of the institution promulgating it38 rather than the
very content of the standard at issue.39
Regarding the traits that such an institution should have, the TBT
definition of standards refers to “recognized” standardization bodies. By the
same token, Article 4.3 of the ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004 defines as
standardizing those bodies which have recognized activities in
standardization.40 On the other hand, the TBT references a recognized
standardization body. In US—Tuna II, the Appellate Body suggested that
recognition is reserved for active standardization bodies and suggested that
“the larger the number of countries that participate in the development of a
standard, the more likely it can be said that the respective body’s activities
in standardization are ‘recognized’.”41
Thus, recognition within the meaning of Article 1.2 of the TBT would
be a function of the degree of recognition by WTO Members (through
participation), rather than the standardization community. The Appellate
Body also noted that no quantitative benchmark should be in place with
respect to standardization activities. It appears that, in this case, contextual
analysis would be necessary to find that a given body has recognized
activities on international standardization. For instance, evidence with
respect to (a) the level of participation of WTO Members in the development
of a given standard; (b) wide recognition of the validity and legality of even
36. Echoed in Regulation 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 Oct.
2012, on European Standardisation, art. 2(1)(a), 2012 O.J. (L 316/12) 19 [hereinafter EU Regulation
1025/2012].
37. See The Guide, supra note 7, at 39–41.
38. Compare the distinction between international, European, and national standards in the EU
Regulation 1025/2012, supra note 36, at art. 2(1)(a), (b) and (d).
39. See also Communication from Columbia, Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Sixth
Triennial Review of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade: Standards, ¶8 ff, WTO Doc.
G/TBT/W/351 (Mar. 21, 2012).
40. In US – Tuna II, the Appellate Body found that the ISO definition of a standardizing body
should assist in the interpretation of the TBT term ‘recognized body’. See US – Tuna II, supra note 18,
at ¶362.
41. US – Tuna II, supra note 18, at ¶390.
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a single standard; and (c) adherence to the TBT Committee Decision of 2000
on principles for the development of international standards (the “TBT
Committee Decision”) would influence the decision as to whether certain
standardization activities are “recognized.”
For the first time in US—Tuna II, in a highly important jurisprudential
turn, adherence to the TBT Committee Decision was linked to the issue of
whether a given standard-setting body has recognized activities. In previous
WTO disputes, international standards that were adopted with limited
majority were considered as relevant international standards by the WTO
adjudicating bodies for the purposes of Article 2.4 of the TBT. In EC—
Sardines, the relevant Codex Alimentarius standard was adopted by 18
parties out of over 150 at that time.42 Similarly, in EC – Hormones, the GMO
standard (an SPS standard, but still indicative of the trend within the WTO
vis-à-vis international standards) was adopted with 33 votes against 29 and
7 abstentions. Both standards were adopted before 1995, that is, in a period
where the GATT did not use international standards as benchmarks for
GATT consistency.43 Therefore, the interest for participating in the creation
of essentially voluntary technical specifications at the international level was
reduced.
However, in the aftermath of the multilateral adoption of the TBT and
SPS in 1995, higher levels of scrutiny of standard-setting practices were
deemed to be warranted, and these disputes only served to alert WTO
Members as to the possible challenges that an unqualified endorsement of
standards adopted elsewhere would entail. Indeed, such jurisprudence, which
in practice failed to take into account important controversies and debates in
ISSBs, was sitting uncomfortably with the advocacy for more openness and
better governance in global institutions.44
As a result, in the year 2000, the TBT Committee agreed on six
principles that should be observed by ISSBs when they develop international
standards: transparency; openness; impartiality and consensus; effectiveness

42. Panel Report, European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, ¶ 5, WTO Doc.
WT/DS231/R (May 29, 2002) [hereinafter EC – Sardines].
43. It should be noted here that the multilateral Tokyo Round Code on Technical Barriers to Trade
(the ‘Standards Code’), included in its art. 2.2 a provision similar to art. 2.4 TBT. However, the Code was
only binding to those GATT contracting parties subscribing to it, that is, 32 countries at the time.
44. Having said this, this jurisprudence is perhaps indicative of the WTO’s reluctance to engage in
a discussion as to the legality of standards developed within Codex Alimentarius. Controversy is still
present as to the standard-setting practices of the Codex as exemplified by the recent Ractopamine case.
See Alessandra Arcuri, The Coproduction of the Global Regulatory Regime for Food Safety Standards:
the SPS, Codex and the Limits of Technocratic Ethos, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDISATION 79 (Panagiotis Delimatsis ed., 2015).
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and relevance; coherence; and addressing the concerns of the developing
world (the so-called “development dimension”). This was a consensusdriven signal by the WTO that rules and procedures in ISSBs had to be
strengthened. Clearly, it was an external call for reform of international
standard-setting activities.45
C. Upgrading the TBT Committee Decision
Although the WTO adjudicating bodies rejected the EU’s position in
EC—Sardines and EC—Hormones regarding the relevance of the
international standards at issue for assessing TBT compliance, anecdotal
evidence suggests that much of the TBT Committee Decision of 2000 was
driven by the U.S., which came to realize that the EU was unduly dominating
the domain of international standardization.46 The legal value of the Decision
quickly became a controversial topic. In EC—Sardines, the Panel found that
the Decision was not binding, but a mere “policy statement of preference.”47
Thus, the fact that the Codex standard at issue was not adopted by consensus
was immaterial. However, the TBT Committee Decision had a substantial
impact on standard-setting processes, particularly within ISO. Whereas ISO
very early reacted positively to the TBT Committee Decision and alleged
that it complied with the principles enshrined therein,48 it also intensified its
work with respect to ensuring due process in standards development,
accommodating more intensively the concerns of developing countries or
broadening the circle of stakeholder participation.
The Appellate Body was not called upon to review the Panel’s finding
in EC—Sardines, but was given the opportunity to address the issue ten years
later in US—Tuna II. Disagreeing with the Panel in EC—Sardines, the
Appellate Body considered the TBT Committee Decision as a “subsequent
agreement” within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) VCLT, which obliges any
WTO treaty interpreter to read the Decision together with the text of the
TBT. The Appellate Body was led to this conclusion based on various
elements. The Decision was adopted by consensus; it bears specifically upon
the interpretation and application of a TBT provision and constitutes a
45. See WTO, TBT Committee, “Second Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation
of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, annex 4: Decision of the Committee on Principles for
the Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations with Relation to art. 2, 5 and
annex 3 of the Agreement,” G/TBT/9, Nov. 13, 2000.
46. I would like to thank Amelia Porges for pointing out this part of the negotiating history to me.
47. EC – Sardines, ¶7.91.
48. See WTO, TBT Committee, “Developments within the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) that are related to the Second Triennial Review of the TBT Agreement,”
Communication from ISO, G/TBT/W/158 (May 18, 2001).
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testimony of Members’ expressed intention to: (a) develop a better
understanding of international standards; (b) ensure the effective application
of the TBT; and (c) clarify and strengthen the concept of international
standards.49
Indeed, agreements following the conclusion of a previous agreement
aiming to specify how existing rules or obligations are to be applied (rather
than to create new—or extend existing—obligations) can fall under Article
31(3)(a) VCLT, constituting a further authentic element of interpretation to
be taken into account along with context.50 However, considering the TBT
Committee Decision as a “subsequent agreement” barely squares with the
EC—Sardines previous finding that the last sentence of the Explanatory Note
in Annex 1.2 TBT also relates to international standards. Then, if no
consensus is required for a standard to be regarded as a “relevant
international standard,” the TBT Committee Decision, by requiring
consensus, amounts to an amendment of the TBT text, at least as far as
international standards are concerned.51 Nonetheless, the Appellate Body
failed to reach such a conclusion expressly.
Still, based on these considerations, the Appellate Body found that an
invitation-only regional standard-setting body (such as the Agreement on the
International Dolphin Conservation Program-AIDCP, the relevant standard
invoked by Mexico) is not open to all WTO Members.52 It also noted that, in
more generalized terms, standardization bodies must be open and transparent
at every stage of developing standards in line with the TBT Committee
Decision.
D. Interim Conclusion
In sum, the TBT exerts a high level of deference towards technical
rationality as expressed through international standard-setting activities
outside the WTO. Standards developed within ISSBs acquire a prominent
role at the WTO through the very text of Articles 2.4 and 2.5 of the TBT,
which requires that WTO Members use “relevant international standards”
and presume compliance with the TBT when such standards are used as a
basis for domestic technical regulations. It is one thing to state that the TBT
49. US – Tuna II, supra note 18, at ¶¶371-2.
50. See Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III (art. 21.5 – Ecuador II), ¶391; and Appellate
Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, ¶265.
51. Practice in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) would also suggest that Members by now view
the TBT Committee Decision as the authoritative document for identifying what an international standard
is. See, among many others, the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Chapter 8 (TBT), art. 8.4.2.
52. However, the Appellate Body cautioned that such a body could still be considered as open if
the invitation was a mere formality. See US – Tuna II, supra note 18, at ¶386.
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Committee would be unable to develop any standards whatsoever. It is quite
another to claim that certain non-WTO rules can vindicate WTO consistency
as long as they are relevant to the product at issue in a WTO dispute
regardless of the process that led to their adoption.53
Quite astonishingly, the TBT entails such delegation of regulatory
power54 without any inquiry into the actual processes used throughout the
development of international technical standards. This is even more
surprising if one considers that such regulatory outsourcing is directed
towards private actors, thereby creating an alternative to formal international
law.55 The US—Tuna II case appears to set the foundations for a shift towards
a more critical approach that would take into account procedural and
substantive safeguards within ISSBs when they develop and approve
international standards.
This only makes sense: ISO in its capacity as the largest purveyor of
international standards inevitably draws normativity and authority from the
users of its standards, that is, traders originating in WTO Members. In other
words, the WTO is the ex post “legitimizer” of international standards by
default as per Article 2.4 of the TBT, but it can potentially be an ex post
arbiter of their legitimacy or a third-level authoritative monitoring and
enforcement device for international standardization in general.
For these reasons, surveying with a view to identifying such guarantees
is important. In the next Section, we discuss the existing procedural and
substantive guarantees in the ISO.
III. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE SAFEGUARDS IN ISO
For many decades, standardization has served a complementary
function to traditional (domestic) command-and-control regulation.56
Indeed, theory suggests that non-binding, or “soft,” norms such as standards
serve a gap-filling function for “harder” forms of law.57 Modern States
concede part of their powers to other actors which can act more effectively
53. Recall that this process is totally out of the control of the WTO.
54. For a similar observation under the SPS, see, Tim Büthe, The globalization of health and safety
standards: delegation of regulatory authority in the SPS Agreement of 1994 establishing the World Trade
Organization, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 220 (2008).
55. Eyal Benvenisti, “Coalitions of the Willing” and the Evolution of Informal International Law,
in COALITIONS OF THE WILLING: AVANTGARDE OR THREAT? 1 (Christian Calliess et al. eds., 2007).
56. As Schepel puts it, “regulators count on [private standards], markets cannot function without
them.” See Harm Schepel, Constituting Private Governance Regimes: Standards Bodies in American
Law, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 161, 164 (Christian Joerges et al. eds.,
2004).
57. LINDA SENDEN, SOFT LAW IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 119–120 (2004).
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and swiftly mainly due to their expertise, focus, and smaller size. This allows
non-state voices to be heard, whereas States reshuffle their regulatory
behavior and supervisory role (for instance, by focusing on ex post control
of a certain activity).58 The advantages of non-coercive, “soft” forms of
regulation transform States into catalysts, coordinators, and supporters of
certain activities at the national or transnational level.59 Notably, the
development of global business leads to an unprecedented expansion of
regulatory rules that have a variety of penholders that are typically closer to
the regulated object.60
Standardization is a quasi-legal form of self-regulation and, depending
on the circumstances and the legal context at hand, it can be a form of coregulation, or else a (hybrid) public-private partnership.61 Some regional
standardization bodies like the European Committee for Standardization
(CEN) fall under the latter category.62 With regard to the EU in particular, it
is by now generally accepted that much of the influence that the EU member
States exercise within the ISSBs is attributed to the New Approach, first
introduced in the mid-80s.63 This approach towards standardization created
a sophisticated cooperative network on standards development at the EU
level among national SSBs, the European Commission, companies, and the
European SSBs. It also aligned the functioning of European standard-setters
with ISSBs through the creation of mirror committees. This network
essentially delegated the creation of all technology-related content to the
European SSBs. The New Approach revolutionized the way trade was
conducted at the EU level and beyond, but also the way that standard-setting
at the EU level (CEN, CENELEC, ETSI) mirrored standard-setting at the
international level (ISO, IEC, ITU).64
58. JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 57–62 (2006); see also HENDRIK SPRUYT, THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND ITS
COMPETITORS 20–21 (1994).
59. KENNETH W. ABBOTT & DUNCAN SNIDAL, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards
Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 57–59 (Walter Mattli
& Ngaire Woods eds., 2009).
60. See David Levi-Faur, The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 12, 13 (2005).
61. See NILS BRUNSSON, Organizations, Markets and Standardization, in A WORLD OF STANDARDS
27–28 (Nils Brunsson & Bengt Jacobsson eds., 2000).
62. THE REGULATORY FUNCTION OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 37 (Fabrizio Cafaggi & Horatia
Muir Watt Elgar eds., 2009).
63. Panagiotis Delimatsis, Standardization in Services – European Ambitions and Sectoral
Realities, 4 EUR. L. REV. 513, 522 (2016).
64. See SCHEPEL, supra note 9, at 104–107; see also European Commission Communication, A
strategic vision for European standards: Moving forward to enhance and accelerate the sustainable
growth of the European economy by 2020, at 17–19, COM (2011) 311 final (June 1, 2011).
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This approach is consistent with the premises of technical rationality,65
a kind of technocratic legitimacy or technocracy-based subsidiarity. It is
considered as the result of low sovereignty costs for governments, all the
more because standardization activities typically result in output of voluntary
nature.66 Even so, it is indicative of the ever-increasing expansion of
legitimate authority outside the State.67 However, under certain
circumstances it may be worrisome if this type of soft law preempts hard
forms of law, which may be justifiably more intrusive, seeking higher levels
of protection.68
As there are manifold technological approaches, an SSB offers a forum
where competitors and competing vested interests can resolve conflicts and
coordination problems.69 Due to its importance, substantial financial
resources and efforts are invested in standardization fora.70 The increase of
standards-related patent disputes and the emergence of industry-sponsored
consortia (but also actions against anticompetitive practices) are indicative
of the growing importance of standardization particularly in high-tech
areas.71 In this regard, for innovation to occur, an active, resourceful
participation in standardization activities is necessary.
Notwithstanding the importance of technical rationality and technical
strength in standardization activities, standardization can become a highly
65. LUIS M. B. CABRAL & TOBIAS KRETSCHMER, Standards battles and public policy, in
STANDARDS AND PUBLIC POLICY 329–31 (Shane Greenstein & Victor Stango eds., 2007); Thomas A.
Loya & John Boli, Standarization in the World Polity: Technical Rationality over Power, in
CONSTRUCTING WORLD CULTURE: INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1875
169–171 (John Boli & George M. Thomas eds., 1999).
66. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54
INT’L ORGANIZATION 421, 441 (2000).
67. See generally David J. Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
261, 261 (2008).
68. See NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, “Soft Law” in a “Hybrid” Organization: The International
Organization for Standardization, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE – THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING
NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 263, 272–273 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
69. See Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Standard-Essential Patents, 123 J. POL. ECON. 547, 547–48
(2015) (arguing that SSBs perform three functions: a discovery, standardization and a regulatory
function).
70. See Joseph Farrell & Timothy Simcoe, Choosing the Rules for Consensus Standardization, 43
RAND J. ECON. 235, 236–38 (2012). See also the observation of the Advocate-General Campos SanchezBordona in the recent Elliott case before the CJEU that ‘[i]ndustry assumes the greater share of the costs
of standardization. . .’. Case C-613/14, James Elliott Construction Limited v. Irish Asphalt Limited,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:63 (2016), ¶ 58.
71. See Mark Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not to), 48
B.C. L. REV. 149, 154 (2007); see also Pierre Larouche & Geertrui Van Overwalle, Interoperability
standards, patents and competition policy, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDISATION 79 (Panagiotis Delimatsis ed., 2015).
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politicized process whereby economic interests along with the quest for
dominance among state and non-state actors shape its functioning.72 The
more important the stakes in standardization become, the fiercer the
competition for increased influence in SSBs is.73 Evidence suggests that
power politics and regulatory capture by the big States may be endemic to
international standard-setting.74
Standardization can also be captured by the industries involved, which
exploit the presence of asymmetric information and organization.75 An
additional variable in this respect is the perennial conflict of interest that is
endemic in SSBs because those subject to the standards are also those that
promulgate them. Industries organize themselves more efficiently than
consumers and manage to capture standard-setting institutions. This can also
be the result of structural bias:76 for instance, ISO is a mainly nongovernmental, industry-driven, international standard-setter.
More recently established sustainability-centered SSBs such as the
International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling
(ISEAL) Alliance claim to be more inclusive.77 Yet, even in such bodies, full
membership is reserved to those presumed to have the necessary technical
expertise; that is, standard-setting organizations and accreditation bodies.78
Consumer associations or NGOs are barely involved in the actual
development of the standards, but may engage more at a later stage in the
consultation process and shortly before the standard becomes final. The
stakeholders involved in international standardization are of a hybrid nature

72. See Jo Swinnen & Thijs Vandemoortele, Trade and the Political Economy of Standards, 11
WORLD TRADE REV. 390, 391 (2012); Pablo Marquez, Standardization and Capture: The Rise of
Standardization in International Industrial Regulation and Global Administrative Law, 7 GLOBAL JURIST
1, 2 (2007).
73. See Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in
Standardization, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 117, 121 (1994).
74. DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL: EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
REGIMES (2007); JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PÉTER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000).
75. In the case of accounting standards, see S.P. Kothari; Karthik Ramann & Douglas J. Skinner,
Implications for GAAP from an analysis of positive research in accounting, 20 J. ACCT. ECON. 246, 251
(2010).
76. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later, 20 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 7, 9 (2009).
77. ISO considers all these relatively new standard-setters as developing purely “private” standards
and thus acting outside the formal standardization system which ISO alone claims to represent. See ISO,
International standards and “private standards,” 2009.
78. See Allison Loconto & Eve Fouilleux, Politics of private regulation: ISEAL and the Shaping
of Transnational Sustainability Governance, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE 166, 176 (2014); see also, Nicolas
Hachez & Jan Wouters, A Glimpse at the Democratic Legitimacy of Private Standards: Assessing the
Public Accountability of GLOBAL G.A.P., 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 677, 695–96 (2011).
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and, like self-regulators, have a conflict of interest inherent in their functions:
they are there to serve the interests of their constituents but also the national
interest.79
Thus, without the necessary procedural guarantees in place, the
beneficial effects of standardization can be undermined. If standardization
cannot resist market power, it may ultimately increase barriers to innovation
and market access. Therefore, mechanisms that maintain an adequate level
of institutional sensitivity and accommodating structures to take into account
important societal values and a multiplicity of interests are necessary.80
A. ISO
1. The (One-Sided) Objective of ISO
ISO was the first general international standardizing body ever
created.81 Its predecessor, the International Standards Association (ISA), a
federation of the national standardizing associations, was mainly a club
dominated by the continental European countries (the “metric bloc”). It
evolved into a truly international body only after World War II.82 ISO is not
an intergovernmental organization, which means that its output is deprived
of any formal coercive force; rather, it is a network (or federation) of national
SSBs, composed of both governmental and industry representatives. The
ISO Secretariat is relatively small (137 full-time employees), serving a
coordination function.
The purpose and normative point of the ISO is to promote
the development of international standards with a view to facilitating trade
and to developing cooperation with respect to intellectual, scientific,
79. See also, Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501–81 (2012) (providing that “the
representation of United States interests before any private international standards organization shall be
carried out by the organization member.” The latter is defined as “the private person who holds
membership in a private international standards organization.”). See 19 U.S.C. § 2543 (quoted in Harm
Schepel, The Empire’s Drains: Sources of Legal Recognition of Private Standardization Under the TBT
Agreement, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW 397, 404 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2011)).
80. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, International “Standards” and International
Governance, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POL. 345, 349 (2001).
81. IEC, the ISSB dealing with standard-setting in the fields of electrical and electronic
engineering, was established about half a century before ISO, in 1906. When established, ISO largely
mirrored IEC’s structure. Over the years, ISO and IEC became the twin organizations for international
standard-setting, having a similar structure, common rules of procedure, joint technical committees and
a common standardization grammar (the regularly revised ISO/IEC Directives, that is).
82. CRAIG MURPHY & JOANNE YATES, THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
STANDARDIZATION (ISO): GLOBAL GOVERNANCE THROUGH VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS (2009); see also
TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS – THE PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN
THE WORLD ECONOMY (2011), 126 ff.
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technological, and economic activity.83 Thus, collective action within ISO
should be about enabling commerce to flourish. Therefore, its activity and
overall assessment should be based on this normative point of collective
action within ISO; that is, how to encourage market access for traders.
As it is, ends and means within ISO are very much economic, tradeoriented and in particular producer-oriented. This is to be expected,
particularly when looking at the composition of national SSBs which are
members of ISO but also the very essence of international technical standardsetting: it is the producers who feed the demand for international standards
to alleviate costs. Indeed, traders are the main, if not only, demanders of
international technical standards with a view to expanding market access,
facilitating the smooth functioning of global supply chains, increasing
interoperability and decreasing compliance costs. Other considerations such
as those relating to safety or consumer protection, for instance, would be
accounted for within national SSBs or domestic public regulatory
authorities.
2. ISO Membership
ISO currently comprises over 160 members, predominantly national
standardization bodies, involved in the development of standards. These
bodies are of a hybrid nature, but primarily composed of representatives from
the private industry, whereas government staff experts act as members in the
national bodies.84 Again, this varies depending on the country’s (centralized
or decentralized) approach to technical standards. In the U.S., for instance,
where ANSI is a private entity, ISO standards are regarded as standards
adopted by and addressed to private parties.85 In Japan, on the other hand, it
is the Japanese Industrial Standards Committee, an advisory council of the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, that represents the Japanese
interests to ISO. While under the auspices of the government, JISC is in
reality a multi-stakeholder body.
Domestic structures influence the positioning of particular national
interests within ISSBs. For instance, allegations that the EU dominates
international standard-setting through its regional SSBs and a “block-voting”

83. ISO Statutes, 17th ed. (2013), art. 2.1.
84. See
ISO,
ISO
Membership
Manual,
I-7
(2015),
http://www.iso.org/iso/
iso_membership_manual.pdf (last accessed on Feb 19, 2017); see also, Steven Bernstein & Erin Hannah,
Non-State Global Standard Setting and the WTO: Legitimacy and the Need for Regulatory Space, 11 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 575, 587 (2008).
85. See David A. Wirth, The International Organization for Standardization: private voluntary
standards as swords and shields, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH AND THE WTO
139, 141 (Geert van Calster, Marie Denise Prévost eds., 2013).
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approach within ISSBs have been common.86 However, it was found that this
observation most likely does not hold, or at least not to the extent argued by
non-EU countries.87
For each country, ISO accepts only one member, which is also the
representative of ISO in that country. ISO has three categories of members:
subscriber, correspondent and full members (or member body). Full
members can be either participating (P-member) or observing members (Omember). Full membership means unrestricted rights in terms of standards
development. Only full members can unconditionally participate and vote.
However, full membership is highly unbalanced: some ISO members
(ABENOR of Benin) only participate in one technical committee (TC), while
other ISO members such as France, Germany or the United Kingdom
participate in over 700 technical bodies, including TCs, subcommittees and
working or ad hoc study groups.88
The degree of participation in these bodies varies: in some, the ISO
member will hold the secretariat, whereas in others it is an O-member. In
2015, there were over 750 active secretariats. Germany, the U.S. and Japan
appear to be sharing the lion’s share of the workload—but also, importantly,
influence. Overall, Europe has traditionally been more active and this still is
the case. By way of illustration, the European standard-setting bodies held
about half of ISO’s active secretariats in 2015.89
Such participatory rights are not extended to subscriber and
correspondent members. Correspondent membership (currently enlisting 38
national standards bodies) amounts to an observer status to ISO.
Correspondent members can also sell and adopt ISO standards nationally.
This category of members varies considerably as well, including countries
in the process of becoming EU members (e.g., Albania) and over ten African
countries. The least active category is subscriber membership (currently
encompassing 5 national standards bodies), whereby the national
86. See ANSI, NATIONAL STANDARDS STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES (2000).
87. See Jan Martin White, A “Single European Voice in International Standardization? American
Perceptions, European Realities, Am. Inst. for Contemp. Ger. Stud. AICGS/DAAD Working Paper
Series, 2003.
88. Interestingly, six out of the ten most active member bodies stem from the European Union. In
addition, and to show the breadth of activities that ISO maintains, there were over 3,500 active technical
bodies within ISO in 2015.
89. See ISO Figures, 2015. Interestingly, eight out of the twenty current ISO Council members are
European standard-setters, representing countries of the European Economic Area (EEA). The ISO
Council is the highest governance body of ISO, appointing, inter alia, the fifteen members of the
Technical Management Board (TMB). Out of the eight national standard-setting bodies that participate
in both the TMB and the ISO Council, three are European (Germany-DIN, France-AFNOR, and UKBSI). For the potential impact of the ISO-CEN Vienna Agreement, see infra under Section IV.B.
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representative standard-setter cannot participate in standard-setting within
ISO. In addition, such bodies cannot sell or adopt ISO standards at the
domestic level.
Recently, ISO decided to expand members’ rights for the last two
categories of membership for the years 2014−19.90 This decision exemplified
ISO’s attempt to allow for the less involved members to become acquainted
with standards development processes, but also address concerns that were
voiced with regard to lack of effective participation possibilities for
developing countries, only for that time period, and without any additional
charge, correspondent and subscriber members will be able to participate in
up to five TCs; comment and vote on draft and final draft ISO standards
prepared in these TCs in which they participate; as well as benefit from the
ISO’s “twinning” system through partnerships with P-Members. However,
they will be unable to have any committee leadership roles, which, in any
case, necessitate considerable savvy.
From the manner that this experimental scheme is structured, one can
infer that ISO would expect these members to be actively involved. For
instance, if they decide to take advantage of the new rights, they must
participate in the TCs as P-members. O-membership is not permitted under
this new scheme. This would mean, for instance, that at the end of the
standards development process those members are obliged to vote (and thus
take an informed stance) on draft standards.
In view of the high preparation costs for such a transition, the possibility
of participating in the twinning scheme sounds more promising for the least
emancipated ISO Members. The rationale behind the twinning system is that
developing countries face many difficulties in playing a leadership role
within ISO. Through partnerships with developed countries, a beneficial
knowledge transfer will most likely take place.91 An example of a rather
successful twinning is the ISO 26000 on social responsibility, whereby
Brazil (Chair) teamed up with Sweden (Vice-Chair) to lead the Working
Group that was created.

90. See OECD/ISO, International Regulatory Co-operation and International Organizations: The
Case of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), OECD (2016), at 23.
91. ISO, Guidance on Twinning in ISO Standards Development Activities: Increasing the
Participation of Developing Country Members, ISO (April 2013). There are four types of twinning:
between P-members; between convenors and co-convenors; between chairs and vice-chairs; and between
secretaries and co-secretaries. The most recent version of the Guidance document was released in
February 2017.
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B. Standard-Setting Process in ISO
1. The Understated Political Element of ISO Standard-Setting
Standard-setting resembles law-making. Standards, like laws, are the
outcome of discussion, bargaining, deliberation and compromise.92
However, standards established by ISSBs like ISO are not law per se, but
rather serve a clear regulatory function prescribing rules for others to
follow.93 The standard-setting process within ISO—and, indeed, all ISSBs—
is a comprehensive regulatory function that not only sets the ends to be
achieved through a particular international standard or “deliverable” but also
is eloquent as to the means (technical for the most part) that should be used.
In other words, not everything about international standardization is
technical; rather, international standardization has a political and technical
dimension alike: the political process determines the ends to be pursued by
materials, products, services, and processes, whereas the technical
dimension relates to the means that are most appropriate to achieve an end.94
While it would be reductive to suggest that all ISO members stand on equal
footing as to the technical part of the standardization process, it would be
equally reductive to purport that the characteristics of the political process
within ISO and the discussion (or lack thereof) of the ends pursued by a
particular standard do not affect the authority of such standard and,
ultimately, the authoritative collective action of ISO as a whole.95
2. The Various Stages of Standard-Setting within ISO
ISO standards are prepared within TCs. However, requests for the
development of a given standard can originate in one or more national
member bodies, a TC, a policy development committee such as DEVCO, the
ISO Secretary-General, or even an organization outside ISO (for instance,
another international organization). Development of a given standard is
typically regarded as a stand-alone project that should be terminated in a

92. See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 15 (2005).
93. See Julia Black, Legitimacy, accountability and polycentric regulation: dilemmas, trilemmas
and organisational response, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS 241, 246 (Anne Peters et
al. eds., 2009).
94. See Efficiency and Accountability in European Standardization Under the New Approach,
Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (1998) 291 final (May
13, 1998) at para. 7.
95. For a more thorough analysis of this particular argument, see Hans Lindahl, ISO Standards and
Authoritative Collective Action: Conceptual and Normative Issues, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL. STANDARDISATION 42 (Panagiotis Delimatsis ed., 2015).
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reasonable period of time.96 Standards can be developed in a new TC or in
an existing one.
TCs are established by the ISO’s technical management board (TMB).97
The TMB has fifteen member bodies appointed or elected by the ISO
Council and is chaired by one of the ISO Vice-presidents.98 The TMB is in
charge of managing the TCs. Consensus is desirable pursuant to the TMB
Working Procedures, but a minimum of two-thirds majority vote may be
sufficient. In the case of a tie, it is the TMB chair who decides.99 The TMB
has a decisive role to play in deciding on the approval or not of project
proposals relating to the future development of new standards and the
allocation of work to TCs. In exercising its functions, the TMB can conduct
informal exploratory enquiries to review the dynamics of a new potential
project. The TMB will establish new TCs only if a two-thirds majority of the
national bodies voting are in favor and at least 5 national member bodies
have pledged to participate actively in the work of the TC.100 Every TC will
normally have a Secretary and a Chairman. Secretariats are allocated by the
TMB.
Because of the rather decentralized form of ISO, the Secretariat of a TC
will be run by an ISO member body (for instance, the Association française
de normalisation-AFNOR or the American National Standards InstituteANSI), which will appoint a Secretary and nominate a Chairman.101 This
solution was initially opted for to bridge the gap between those national SSBs
which wanted ISO to have a coordinating role and those who saw ISO as a
powerful international standard-setter.102 In theory at least, the TC

96. See ISO/IEC Directives Part 1, Consolidated ISO Supplement – Procedures specific to ISO,
7th edition, ISO (2016), art. 2.1 ff [hereinafter ISO/IEC Directives].
97. Id., at 1.9.1.
98. See ISO Statutes, 17th edition (2013), art. 9. Current TMB members are (dates of term expiry
included): ABNT (Brazil-2017); AFNOR (France-2017); ANSI (USA-2018); BSI (United Kingdom2018); DIN (Germany-2018); DSM (Malaysia-2017); GOST R (Russia-2018); JISC (Japan-2019); KATS
(Korea-2018); SA (Australia-2019); SABS (South Africa-2017); SAC (China-2017); SIS (Sweden2017); SFS (Finland-2017); and SNV (Switzerland-2019).
99. TMB Working Procedures, February 2014, art. 4.2ff.
100. Thus, the voluntary character of international standards does not only relate to compliance with
the final standard, but also to active participation in the development of such a standard.
101. Crucially, this important task can be further delegated to private parties. For instance, ANSI
has procedures in place that allow the delegation to private parties of ANSI participation to ISO. See
ANSI, ANSI Procedures for U.S. Participation in the International Standards Activities of ISO – annex
B: Criteria for the Development and Coordination of U.S. Positions in the International Standardization
Activities of the ISO and IEC, January 2017.
102. MURPHY & YATES, supra note 82, at 36.
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Secretariat is bound to act in a purely international capacity rather than
serving the national point of view.103
Depending on the breadth of the workload, sub-committees or working
groups may be created. Working groups are quite important and becoming a
convener in those groups may influence the structure, content and form of
the final standard. According to the ISO/IEC Directives (hereinafter “the
Directives”), the convener will normally be the project leader and will ensure
that, in a given period of time, a draft standard will be available for the subcommittee’s and/or the parent TC’s consideration.
There are over 230 active TCs within ISO.104 As the work of a given
TC is very technical, having a bird’s-eye view of developments in each and
every TC is very difficult, if not highly unlikely. Typically, national SSBs
are called upon to act as secretariats in technical committees. Secretariats are
distributed unevenly, with ANSI and DIN (Deutsches Institut für Normung,
ANSI’s German counterpart) maintaining a disproportionally large number
of such secretariats.105 By way of illustration, the German and American
SSBs together account for almost forty percent of the active TC secretariats
and convenerships.106
There are seven “project stages” that show the development of the
technical work within a TC.
Table 1. The Stages of Standards Development within ISO
Project stage
Associated document
Preliminary
stage
Proposal stage

Name

Abbreviation

Preliminary work item

PWI

New work item proposala

NP

Preparatory stage Working draft(s)

a

Committee stage Committee draft(s)a
b

Enquiry stage

Enquiry draft

Approval stage

final draft International
Standardc

WD
CD
ISO/DIS
IEC/CDV
FDIS

103. See ISO/IEC Directives, supra note 96, at art. 1.9.2.
104. A list of TCs can be found online: at http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards_development/
list_of_iso_technical_committees.htm (last accessed on Feb. 2, 2017).
105. For the current figures, see ISO in figures 2015, online: http://www.iso.org/iso/
iso_figures_2015.xls (last accessed on Feb. 2, 2017).
106. Id.
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ISO, IEC or ISO/IEC

a

These stages may be omitted.
Draft International Standard in ISO, committee draft for vote in IEC.
c
May be omitted.
Preliminary work items are introduced by simple majority of the Pmembers.107 This can then develop into a new work item proposal which will
be approved provided that a simple majority of the P-members in the TC
agree and at least 4 P-members commit to actively contribute to the project
(in TCs with over 17 P-Members, at least 5 P-members should make a
commitment to this respect).
In the preparatory stage, a work draft will be prepared. In this respect,
the creation of a working group and the appointment of a convener may be
necessary. Once a Committee draft is ready, national member bodies of the
TC (both P- and O-Members) have the opportunity to submit comments, and
consensus building on the technical content is sought. Comments should be
compiled and the TC secretariat is responsible for indicating the action taken
on each of the comments received. Successive drafts will be discussed in this
respect until consensus among the P-members of the TC is achieved.108 Once
agreement is reached on the technical issues, an enquiry draft is circulated.
At the enquiry stage, the draft standard is circulated to all national
bodies for a 3-month vote. Importantly, this is the first time that ISO
members that do not participate in the relevant TC will see the draft standard.
Votes can be positive or negative—or ISO Members can inform of their
abstention. Positive or negative votes can be accompanied by technical
comments (or technical objections, respectively). A two-thirds majority of
the P-member votes of the TC and the presence of no more than 25% of
negative votes of all ISO members leads to the approval of the enquiry draft.
In practice, approval of at least 75% of the national bodies casting a vote is
striven for. Crucially, negative votes not accompanied by technical reasons
do not count.
This means that, in theory at least, a standard could pass this stage even
in the—admittedly extreme, but still theoretically possible—case of
abstention by all ISO members who are not participating in the relevant TC
or in the presence of negative votes which raise non-technical concerns. This
highlights the weight of P-Members’ behavior participating in the TC, but
b

107. See ISO/IEC Directives, supra note 96, at art. 2.2.1.
108. As discussed infra section III.C, consensus within ISO does not imply unanimity, but rather
“absence of sustained opposition.”
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also undermines the importance of the political element in the technical
standard-setting process.109
If no negative votes were received,110 the TC can proceed to the
publication of the final standard. In case the above-mentioned criteria are not
met, the TC prepares a final text after incorporating the new comments and
suggestions received. This final draft international standard (DIS) will be
circulated to national member bodies for approval (approval stage). The
same criteria for approval apply at this stage with the only difference that
comments are no longer accepted in case of a positive vote. Negative votes
must again state the technical reasons for rejecting the final draft. Otherwise,
they do not count. If the criteria (2/3 majority of P-Members of the TC and
no more than 25% of negative votes cast) are not met, the draft standard shall
be referred back to the TC. In this case, the TC can even cancel the entire
project or resubmit a modified draft which will undergo all previous stages.
Alternatively, the TC may decide to publish the draft standard as a
technical specification, particularly in a case of persistent opposition or
doubt as to consensus. In practice, this may happen only in cases of receiving
negative votes that state technical objections and exceed the 25% benchmark
of the total votes cast. A technical specification shall not be in conflict with
an existing international standard. Later on (typically every three years), it
can be reviewed with a view to being adopted as an international standard,
provided that the criteria are met.
Finally, in terms of deadlines, three different tracks for the development
of standards are possible: 1) the accelerated standards development track (24
months); 2) the default standards development track (36 months); and 3) the
enlarged standards development track (48 months). The time runs from the
date of adoption as an approved work item.111 In practice, standards
development can last much longer, notably in cases of controversy.
A fast-track procedure is envisaged in the Directives,112 for instance, in
cases of a standard developed in another ISSB that is recognized by the ISO
or IEC Council. If the fast-track procedure is opted for, then the document
can be submitted directly for vote as a draft international standard to the ISO
members through the relevant TC or subcommittees (SC) (enquiry stage).
That document can be submitted directly as a final draft international

109. See discussion supra section III.B.1.
110. Abstentions and negative votes do not count unless they raise technical objections. ISO/IEC
Directives, supra note 96, at art. 2.6.3.
111. Id., art. 2.1.6.1.
112. Id., annex F(2).
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standard if the external ISSB is recognized by the ISO Council (approval
stage).113
The fast-track procedure can in theory reduce the time needed for a
standard to be adopted, but it can also lead to certain frictions in situations
where a competing standard is discussed at the same time within the ISO
“ordinary” standard-setting process. For instance, something similar
happened in the process that led to the adoption of Microsoft’s Office Open
XML (OOXML) as an ISO standard (ISO/IEC 29500), overriding the effort
of the proponents of Open Document Format (ODF) within ISO.114 In this
respect, Microsoft was accused of attempting to circumvent the rules by first
lobbying for the adoption of OOXML within Ecma International and then
initiating the fast-track procedure taking advantage of the fact that Ecma
International was an external Category A liaison body of the ISO/IEC JTC
1.115
3. Collaborative International Standard-Setting
ISO works in close collaboration with the IEC on all matters relating to
electrotechnical standardization. While ISO and the IEC share the same set
of directives, there are also directives which are specific to ISO or the IEC.
In 1987, the first Joint Technical Committee (JTC 1) was created between
ISO and IEC to prepare standards in the areas of ICT, including multimedia,
ICT security, and cloud computing.116 Along with ISO and IEC, a third
important standardization body is the ITU.
These three organizations are recognized as the only international
standardization bodies in the field of technical standards for certain WTO
Members, such as the EU.117 In 2001, ISO, IEC, and ITU established the
World Standards Cooperation (WSC) with the goal of “strengthening and
advancing the voluntary consensus-based International Standards
system,”118 which they created through the avoidance of duplication and

113. ISO/IEC Directives, supra note96, at F.2.1.2.
114. See also Maija Palmer, Microsoft wins key ISO certification, FIN. TIMES (April 1, 2008), at
https://www.ft.com/content/055e5bd0-0014-11dd-825a-000077b07658?mhq5j=e6
[https://perma.cc/
GU9L-GBVF]
115. Note that the JTC 1 has its own procedures for fast-track standard-setting and appeals. Notably
with respect to appeals, within JTC 1, not only P-members but any member/national body can appeal
against an action or inaction. See ISO/IEC Directives, supra note 96, at art. 5.1.2.
116. See ISO/IEC JTC 1—INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, (last accessed on Feb. 15, 2017) at
https://www.iso.org/isoiec-jtc-1.html [https://perma.cc/7SWA-CDAX].
117. See also EU Regulation 1025/2012, supra note 36, at art. 2 (9).
118. ABOUT, (last accessed on Feb. 15, 2017) at http://www.worldstandardscooperation.org/
about.html [https://perma.cc/V6AE-L38D].
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overlap of work. The three ISSBs also cooperate in the area of patent policy
by adhering to common guidelines.119
C. Consensus Building in ISO
Generally, ISSBs choose consensus as the decision-making mode par
excellence, which ISO defines as “general agreement, characterized by the
absence of sustained opposition to substantial issues by any important part
of the concerned interests and by a process that involves seeking to take into
account the views of all parties concerned and to reconcile any conflicting
arguments.”120 (Emphasis added). However, it is made clear that consensus
need not imply unanimity. In addition, the Directives consider sustained
oppositions as a peculiar category of objection. They are defined as
“views…maintained by an important part of the concerned interest and
which are incompatible with the committee consensus.”121
The Directives call upon the leadership of the relevant body to solve the
issue based on certain guidelines. For example, they require that the
leadership of the committee ensure that the opposition is sustained by an
important part of the concerned interest, which will vary depending on the
dynamics of the relevant committee. If so, it should be dealt with in good
faith. The right of opposing views to be heard is guaranteed in the Directives.
However, and crucially, a sustained opposition is not akin to a right to veto.
Thus, good-faith efforts are warranted, but progress of the committee work
is not conditional on actual resolution of the issue.
Although unanimity is not required, most international organizations
aim for consensus building and have those mechanisms in place in their
constitutions and by-laws.122 However, consensus can cause delays, whereby
competitors argue for their preferred solution or simply hold out until one
side concedes or withdraws to the benefit of the other.123 Endorsement of a
given standard at the end of the process can generate substantial rents,
making the effort worthwhile124 but also confirming the value of the
119. See ISO/IEC Directives, supra note 96, at annex I.1.
120. Id. at art. 2.5.6. This definition is generally accepted as reflecting the current understanding of
consensus in SSBs. See also EU Regulation 1025/2012, supra note 36, at annex II, ¶ 3(b).
121. See ISO/IEC Directives, supra note 96, at art. 2.5.6.
122. See Jens Steffek, Sources of Legitimacy Beyond the State: A View from International Relations,
in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 81, 94 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004).
123. Farrell and Saloner first described this tactic as a ‘war of attrition’, suggesting that it may lead
to the technically best solution, but with a significant delay. See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner,
Coordination through committees and markets, 19 RAND J. ECON. 235, 238 (1988).
124. Marc Rysman & Timothy Simcoe, Patents and the Performance of Voluntary Standard-Setting
Organizations, 54 MGMT. SCI. 1920, 1924 (2008).
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standard-setter as a stabilizing factor in its capacity as a coordinating
authority.
In addition, it was shown that, in areas of rapid technological innovation
with important rents at stake (distributional conflicts), the standard-setting
process may be slower in a consensus-based standard-setting body, but
delays are efficient when the underlying technology improves over time.
Therefore, and quite importantly, at the end of the lengthy process it is likely
that higher quality outcomes will be produced.125 This means that, contrary
to conventional belief, and somehow counterintuitively, striving for
consensus may have a very limited impact on the technical and scientific
excellence of a given standard. However, when vested interests are strong,
relaxing the consensus requirement or identifying a neutral participant to
break the deadlock (i.e., binding arbitration or appeal mechanisms) may be
preferable to increase the effectiveness of a given standard.126
In practice and as explained earlier, ISO does not decide by unanimity
or even consensus, but rather has adopted qualified majority voting rules in
the various stages (from the preliminary stage to the enquiry draft and up to
the publication stage) that lead to the adoption of an international standard.127
According to the Directives, within ISO, if there is doubt as to whether
consensus was reached for registration as an enquiry draft (that is, the TC
draft), a two-thirds majority of the actively involved members (“Pmembers”) in the TC approving it would suffice.128
The “two-thirds rule” of the active members and the 75% of votes cast
seem to be generally applicable. Thus, rather than unanimity, these qualified
majority voting modalities should be regarded as the general benchmark
expressing the multilateral scientific consensus in the international technical
standardization community. In line with this observation, a final draft
international standard circulated by a TC is approved if two-thirds of the
votes cast by the P-members in the TC (rather than of the entire ISO
membership) are in favor and not more than one quarter of the total number
of votes of national member bodies cast are negative. The two conditions are
cumulative. Abstentions do not count and the same goes for negative votes
that are not based on technical reasons.129 This applies to both the enquiry
stage and the approval stage. This means that objections with respect to
procedural defects, for instance, would need to be raised at an early stage
125. Timothy Simcoe, Standard Setting Committees: Consensus Governance for Shared Technology
Platforms, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 305, 331 (2012).
126. Farrell & Simcoe, supra note 70, at 246.
127. See ISO/IEC Directives, supra note 96, at cl. 2.
128. Id. at cl. 2.5.6.
129. Id. at cl. 2.7.3.
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(i.e., at the moment that the relevant TC or subcommittee still discusses
drafting). This is also made clear in the Directives of 2015, which provide
the following:
…to avoid re-discussion, national bodies have the responsibility of
ensuring that their technical standpoint is established taking account of all
interests concerned at national level, and that this standpoint is made clear
at an early stage of the work rather than, for example, at the final
(approval) stage. Moreover, national bodies need to recognize that
substantial comments tabled at meetings are counter-productive, since no
opportunity is available for other delegations to carry out the necessary
consultations at home, without which rapid achievement of consensus will
be difficult.130

However, for this to be possible in the first place, effective participation is a
prerequisite. Effective participation would include the ability to be at all
meetings, to follow several meetings simultaneously, which may be
organized in different places around the world, and to find the way through
a large number of technical documents in a short period of time.
D. Other Procedural and Substantive Guarantees
The Directives incorporate expressis verbis a right to appeal against
decisions on new work items, committee drafts, enquiry drafts, or final draft
international standards within 3 months from the decision at issue. However,
and quite crucially, this right to appeal is not unqualified; rather, it is reserved
exclusively for P-Members. The TMB is in charge of considering such
appeals. Appeals can be filed by P-Members only on condition that they are
against the Statutes and Rules of Procedure or the Directives, or detrimental
to trade, safety, health or the environment. Appeals can relate not only to
technical but also to administrative issues. However, they do not have
suspensive effect, as the standards development can continue up to and
including the approval stage.131
In addition, appeals against new work items, committee drafts, enquiry
drafts, or final draft international standards are accepted only if they relate
to technical matters or the reputation of ISO is at stake.132 When it comes to
issues that must be answered in the negative or the affirmative, approval by
the TMB requires that at least two-thirds of the total votes be positive.133

130. Id. at 5 (emphasis added)
131. Id. at cl. 5.5.
132. See id. at cl. 5.1.3 (suggesting in the provision that the appeal should relate to a ‘question of
principle.’ A teleological/contextual interpretation, for instance, the privileged rights of P-members or
the fact that negative votes do not count unless they are based on technical reasons, would suggest that
this equates to technical reasons). Id.
133. See TMB Working Procedures, supra note 99, at cl. 4.
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Abstentions within the TMB are generally discouraged. If the TMB is in
favor of moving forward with the appeal, a conciliation panel is established.
The panel should resolve the dispute within a maximum of 6 months or refer
the issue back to the TMB with its recommendations as to how the issue
should be settled. The decision by the TMB can be appealed before the ISO
Council Board. The decision by the latter on any appeal should be delivered
within 3 months and is final.
Furthermore, the Directives provide for a fairly detailed procedure that
should precede the establishment of a new TC or the adoption of a new work
item notably focusing on adducing evidence to substantiate the necessity
thereof. The onus in this case lies with the proposer, particularly in
establishing a substantial case about the “market relevance of the
proposal.”134 Obviously, the level of detail in such proposals will vary,
depending on the availability of technical knowledge and the existence of
work previously conducted within ISO or elsewhere. Annex C of the
Directives includes various procedural and substantive guarantees relating to
the introduction of new work items (specificity of the proposed item; relation
to and impact on existing standards or work items; an indication of possible
participating countries; an indication of stakeholders and so on) that aim to
ensure the viability of the new work item and spell out the need for, as well
as the global relevance of, a new standard in a particular area. The Directives
provide a list of documents that can be submitted such as statements
explaining the technological, economic, societal, and environmental benefits
of a proposed standard.135 However, the proposer is not bound by this list;
rather, the proposer shall make first and foremost a substantial business case
for the market relevance and need for a given proposed standard.
In its continuous attempt to maintain its relevance, ISO has established
two policy committees to inform its standardization work.
First, the ISO Committee on developing country matters (DEVCO) was
created in 1961. DEVCO currently has 101 participating and 52 observing
member bodies and meets annually. DEVCO also monitors the ISO Action
Plan for developing countries.136 In accordance with ISO’s practice, PMembers have the upper hand in the discussions and actions, whereas many
African countries but also other developing and least developed countries,
having the status of correspondent members within ISO, can only participate
as observers (O-members) and thus have no meaningful say. These countries

134. ISO/IEC Directives, supra note96, at annex C, C.3.2.
135. Id. annex C, C.4.13.3.
136. See Int’l Org. for Standardization [ISO], Action Plan for Developing Countries 2016-2020, at 3
(2016).
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cannot participate, nominate experts, nor be in a chair’s group within the
DEVCO.
Second, the ISO Committee on Consumer Policy (COPOLCO) was
created in 1978 and currently has 68 participating and 56 observing member
bodies. To date, COPOLCO has published 7 standards (mostly guides on
how to take into account consumer issues when developing standards) under
its direct responsibility (including updates of previous editions of guides).
Direct links with consumers at the national level are rather weak or, for
certain countries, non-existent. ISO, however, expects that consumer
interests are taken into account at the level of the national standards body.137
When consumer-related issues are important elements of the development of
an international standard, national standards bodies should consider
including consumer representatives in their delegation.138 It seems that the
involvement of consumers and consumer associations at the domestic level
is a function of the sophistication of the national standards body.139 Be that
as it may, COPOLCO is currently a committee where only ISO Members,
that is, national standard-setting bodies, and no consumer associations are
represented.
Furthermore, the Directives provide for the regular review of
international standards that should take place every 5 years at the latest. The
review should not last more than 5 months and ends with a decision by the
relevant committee to revise, confirm, or withdraw the standard at issue. For
confirmation, the threshold is rather low: use in at least 5 countries and
positive vote by the simple majority of the P-members participating in the
committee. If these members call for amendments to the standard, then the
revision process is initiated. Use of the standard at issue in less than 5
countries should lead to the withdrawal of that standard.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that due to the importance of protecting
intellectual property rights in standardization activities, ISO, ITU and the
IEC agreed on a common patent policy in 2007 to address the problems
associated with standard-essential patents (SEP).140 In this case, substantive
guarantees for intellectual property protection include the right of the patent
holder to deny access to her protected right (and thus the final draft standard

137. See, e.g., ISO, Guidance for national standards bodies – Engaging stakeholders and building
consensus, at 8–9 (2010).
138. See ISO/IEC, Statement on consumer participation in standardization work, ISO/IEC/GEN
01:2001.
139. See, e.g., ISO, Involving consumers – Why and how, at 10–11 (2011); see also CEN/CENELEC,
Guide 2: Consumer Interests and the preparation of European Standards, at 1–2 (1st ed., Dec. 2001).
140. See ISO/IEC Directives, supra note 96, at annex I.
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should not include provisions depending on the patent right) or to disclose
her rights and then negotiate licensing and the level of royalties under fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND).141 The policy of ISSBs
in principle would entail a hands-off approach: patent holders would be
entitled to defend their rights vis-à-vis potential users; yet, due to the
importance of the standard that is based on the patented input, the holders of
that patent would be required to negotiate agreements on the use of such
patents on FRAND terms outside the ISSBs.
In other words, bilateral agreements or settlement are encouraged but
not administered by the ISSBs. Various issues of competition law nature can
be of importance in this regard, including non-disclosure of patented rights
in order to extract higher royalties once the standard is adopted; prohibitive
royalties which in effect limit market access; abuse of dominant position and
so on. Again, these are issues that would be scrutinized by domestic
competition authorities and subsequently by courts rather than the ISSBs
themselves.142
IV. AN ASSESSMENT OF ISO’S STANDARDIZATION-RELATED
PRACTICES
A. ISO at the Crossroads
ISO has been at the forefront of international rule-making in recent
years. In view of the importance of technical standards for economic
development and sustainable growth, limited participation and effective
exclusion in ISO standard-setting activities have sparked debate. More
recently, considerable efforts were made to increase effective participation
but also expand the substantive subject matter of the organization to include
less technical areas such as those relating to the environment, labor, or
human rights.143
All in all, the ISO standard-setting process seems to be quite
streamlined, but various, significant issues remain. For instance, recall that
5 P-members suffice for the creation of a new TC. This would mean, at least
in theory, that 3 P-members (simple majority) would be able to approve a
141. See generally, Patrick D. Curran, Standard-Setting Organizations: Patents, Price Fixing, and
Per Se Legality, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 983, 991—4 (2003).
142. See Case C-170/13, Huawei Tech. Co. Ltd. V. ZTE Corp., Judgment of the Court of July 16,
2015 (CJEU) (discussing the rights and obligations of a SEP holder).
143. See International Organization for Standardization [ISO], International Guidance Standard on
Social Responsibility - ISO 26000 (Nov. 2010); STEPHANIE BIJLMAKERS & GEERT VAN CALSTER, You’d
be surprised how much it costs to look this cheap! A Case-Study of ISO 26000 on Social Responsibility,
The Law, Economics and Politics of International Standardization 275, 275−310 (Delimatsis ed. 2015).
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new work item.144 Again, as noted above, a minimum of 4 P-members would
be needed to commit that they will participate actively in the preparation of
the new standard. Even so, in an organization of over 160 member bodies,
this is too low a threshold. In addition, note that a two-thirds majority
(following our example, that is, 3 out of the 4 P-members!) would suffice to
bring forward the draft standard as an enquiry draft. This would mean that,
in theory, 3 P-members could lead the entire process up to the enquiry stage.
Crucially in practice, all ISO members (that is, not only the relevant TC
members) will see the draft standard for the first time at the enquiry stage.
At that moment they merely have three months to raise technical objections
and seek changes. In view of the low threshold applied, it is questionable
why comments should be limited to the technical aspects of the standard.
Procedural deficiencies should be allowed to be raised by the membership at
this level as well, all the more because these could not be raised earlier. With
so many committees working simultaneously on a broad array of topics, one
would reasonably assume that many members would become familiar with
a particular standard proposed for the first time during this 3-month period
of voting. Depending on the complexity of the technical content involved,
while for some ISO members the time may be sufficient, for others (who
lack a high level of sophistication in technical matters) three months would
rather short period of time to get acquainted with complex technical matters.
Acquisition of technical information in such a short period of time becomes
so costly that members prefer not to seek acquiring the necessary information
at all. If members know that their vote will not influence the final decision,
they will not invest in information.145
One could argue here, that even at that stage, ISO members could still
express their disagreement to avoid the adoption of a shaky standard. In
addition, P-members that participated in the TC work have a strong incentive
to prepare a first-rate enquiry draft to compensate for the high start-up costs,
but also because the more time they invest in preparing such a draft, the
higher their interest is for such a draft to be of high quality so that it is
accepted more easily. Furthermore, allowing voting at a very early stage may
jeopardize the entire standard-setting process by making it overly political.146
Thus, from this point of view, allowing any objections to be raised for
the first time at the enquiry stage does not constitute any serious prejudice
144. See ISO, supra note 143 at cl. 1.5.7 in conjunction with cl. 2.3.5.
145. See Nicola Persico, Committee Design with Endogenous Information, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 1,
18 (2003).
146. See David Stasavage, Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and
International Bargaining, 58 INT’L ORG. 667, 670 (2004) (stating that transparent procedures may lead
certain agents to posture by taking uncompromising positions that may lead to deadlock).
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on the non-participating ISO members in the TC. This may also be in line
with the spirit of ISO voting: ISO does not introduce a general decisionmaking system, but a de facto supermajority system whereby votes
presuppose information acquisition. It is contestation on the technical
grounds that can improve a given standard—and such contestation can even
occur at the enquiry stage.
Both views presented here have their value and are sensible. However,
even if the latter view is correct, no plausible reason seems to exist that
would prevent TC members from sharing information with all ISO members
about work on a new standard early on. For instance, while the committee
draft stage seems to be quite important and various procedural guarantees
are in place (for instance, prompt notification; notice and comment
procedures; requirement to respond to all comments; revisions to be
subsequently circulated), this stage is limited to the ISO members
participating in the relevant committee. Whereas the committee draft stage
appears to play a crucial role in line with the core principles of due process,
the Directives suggest that, under certain circumstances, this important stage
can be skipped if consensus (as defined within ISO) among the P-members
is achieved.147
A notification requirement towards all ISO members would constitute
a procedural guarantee with immediate positive impact on the substantive
rights of other ISO members. Such information, for instance, could be
publicly available on the ISO website with a short, expedited
notification/alert system. In extreme cases of opposition within a TC, early
(perhaps indicative) voting could act as an alternative buffer that allows
certain standards to move forward, provided that the broader ISO
membership supports them despite opposition within the TC. Finally,
objections should be allowed to be raised—and appeal procedures should
allow for that—if any ISO member can prove serious prejudice to its rights.
Significant path dependencies remain within ISO, as the previous
analysis demonstrated, alluding sometimes to the need for a shift in ISO’s
modus operandi: for one, the political dimension of ISO standard-setting
appears not to be yet of immediate concern for the ISO leadership. This
becomes obvious when we look at the imbalances between the rights of Pmembers, on one hand, and the other ISO members, on the other; the late
notification of draft standards to all ISO members (inquiry drafts); the lack
of any weight being given to negative votes which are not based on technical
considerations; or, again, the limited possibilities for appeals which are not
premised on technical grounds. Whereas the requirement for giving reasons
147. See ISO/IEC Directives, supra note 9696, annex SS.
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is generally of a due process nature and aims at limiting arbitrary objections
and delays, the non-participating ISO members in the relevant TC would
more often than not ignore basic technical features of a particular standard
that is presented to them as an inquiry draft. Those participating actively (Pmembers), on the other hand, would have the necessary information.
It seems that attempting to remedy this asymmetry of information at the
enquiry stage only is irrational. Rather, it achieves the opposite of what an
inclusive international organization should be striving for: it appears to
accentuate the gap between the more sophisticated—technically speaking—
ISO members, and those which struggle to build capacity. The latter
(admittedly, less informed members), when facing an enquiry draft would
prefer to abstain148 or even cast a positive vote,149 which nevertheless is not
necessarily based on a full grasp of what the standard stands for. Thus, the
requirement for giving technical reasons appears to function as a
presumption of fitness for purpose of the enquiry draft. This presumption is
rebuttable, but obviously not many ISO members will have the capacities
and knowledge to rebut effectively.
This excessive focus on the technical aspects of standardization and late
notification of proposed draft standards may lead to undue dominance of
certain ISO members—most likely the sophisticated ones. This approach
offers little in the effort to establish more inclusive forms of governance at
the international level. This situation may perpetuate even at the postadoption stage: at the moment of review of a given standard, the use of a
given standard by just 5 countries would be sufficient for a standard to be
regarded as an international standard of global relevance for ISO purposes.
Other than the practice of exclusion that such a low threshold implies, it is
also indicative of generally low thresholds that are set by the Directives with
respect to key aspects of standard-setting, as mentioned earlier.
Active participation is one of the ISO principles according to the ISO
Code of Conduct for the technical work.150 This justifies the privileged status
that P-members enjoy within ISO—a kind of reward for their willingness to
invest in promoting standard-setting (e.g., through active participation in the
148. In that case, because voting becomes costly for the uninformed voters (the price for acquiring
information), they prefer to delegate their votes to the informed ones. See Timothy J. Feddersen &
Wolfgang Pesendorfer, The Swing Voter’s Curse, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 408, 408−10 (1996) (describing
the behavior of uninformed voters in choosing between political candidates).
149. For instance, they may cast a positive vote if they believe that the promoters of the standard
would not jeopardize their reputation to bring forward for voting a standard of dubious quality. See Gilat
Levy, Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules, 97 AM. ECON. REV.
150, 150−52 (2007).
150. International Organization for Standardization [ISO], ISO Code of Conduct for the Technical
Work (2016).
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early stages of new work items; the running of secretariats, convenerships,
or other leadership positions; or the posting of technical comments). This,
however, neglects at the same time to acknowledge that standard-setting is
inextricably linked with learning-by-doing; effective participation on a
broader basis will never occur without capacity-building. This is the reason
why the system of twinning is a noteworthy initiative that may change—
even if only at a slow pace—the ecology of international technical standardsetting, just as regional standard-setting initiatives in the developing world
have. The case of the EU is telling in this respect. It is by now accepted that
the empowerment of the European standard-setting bodies through the New
Approach within the EU also had beneficial effects for the weight of the
EU’s bargaining power within ISSBs.
Participation in standard-setting is not only a matter of states, but very
much of non-state actors, including industry, consumer or labor associations,
NGOs, or other private interest groups. ISO claims to carry out its work in
an “international, multi-stakeholder, multi-sector environment.”151
Nevertheless, in principle, ISO would encourage its members to involve
stakeholder interests at the national level, which then would have to be taken
into account when preparing the national position of the representative SSB
at ISO. With respect to consumer interests, COPOLCO has been active in
addressing consumer-related aspects of standards by publishing guides
instead of ordinary ISO standards. COPOLCO works under the ISO general
Secretariat’s responsibility, which appears difficult to square with the
member-driven tradition of ISO.
In the face of increasing criticism, ISO has attempted to open up its
doors to consumers directly. For instance, Consumers International, a global
federation of consumer organizations from over 110 countries, has
established a liaison with COPOLCO. The relationship, however, is rather
asymmetrical, with P-Members still leading the discussions and ensuing
decisions within COPOLCO. This approach becomes increasingly
untenable: as noted earlier, whereas producers used to be the only demanders
of international standards, nowadays consumers also seek the adoption of
international standards that take their concerns into account. Increasing labor
mobility and cross-border safety concerns due to defective products can
indeed lead to more proactive advocacy on the side of consumers at the
international level. The same goes for labor organizations in certain areas of

151. Id.
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ISO standard-setting, such as management and production systems.152 Thus,
groups other than producers may have a substantial interest in participation.
In addition, the expansion of the ISO agenda may lead to awkward
results in view of the upgrade that the ISO output has experienced after the
adoption of the TBT agreement. This became particularly apparent in the
negotiations that led to the promulgation of the ISO 26000 guidance
document on social responsibility.153 Although generally regarded as an
international standard for ISO purposes, the document clarifies that it must
not be considered as such for the purposes of the TBT agreement. Nor is it
intended to provide a basis for any assumption or finding that a measure is
consistent with WTO obligations, thereby discrediting the value of Article
2.4 TBT when assessing this particular ISO deliverable. As noted in the
relevant literature, this exercise of self-restraint vis-à-vis the TBT agreement
by ISO was the result of intense negotiations within the multi-stakeholder
working group on social responsibility to limit the scope of the final
product.154 However, one wonders whether this is the price to pay for a more
open approach on standard-setting and if so, what repercussions it may have
on the relationship between ISO and WTO if such an approach spills over
beyond guidance documents.
Experimenting with new forms of standard-setting such as multistakeholder standardization may be time-consuming, as it brings with it new
ethos in the discussions, and thus takes traditional standard-setters—that
focus predominantly on the technical aspects of the deliverables—out of
their comfort zone. As the negotiations on the ISO 26000 showed, learningby-doing has its consequences: it took about six years to finalize the guidance
document, which is of a softer nature than a traditional ISO standard, as it
cannot be used for third-party certification.
Even so, the ISO 26000, with its “alternative production line” model, is
a worthwhile standard-setting effort in view of the interests that were
gathered to shape it: experts from more than 90 countries and 40 international
or broadly-based regional organizations representing governments, NGOs,
152. Of course, questions of legitimacy, representation, participation and accountability can equally
be raised with respect to consumer and labor organizations pointing to the need for benchmarking and
potential reforms. In an era of increased legalization of rule-making at the international level, no actor
active at this level is immune from such scrutiny. However, exclusion clearly is not an answer to such
potential problems, all the more because evidence in certain sectors shows how important the background
of standard-setters is for the final design of the standard. See Abigail Allen & Karthik Ramanna, Towards
an Understanding of the Role of Standard Setters in Standard Setting, 55 J. ACCOUNT. ECON. 66, 79−81
(2013) (examining the role of individual standard setters on accounting standards).
153. See ISO supra note143.
154. See BIJLMAKERS & CALSTER supra note 143, at 300.
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consumer associations, industries, and so on came together to agree on a
single guidance document.155 For ISO, this exercise is not only a matter of
substance and scope, but also a matter of continuing relevance: with everincreasing competition coming from ISEAL alliance, GlobalG.A.P.,156 and
other newcomers in the standard-setting market and with much focus shifting
towards sustainability of production methods and global supply chains, ISO
cannot simply disregard these voices.157 Although these relatively new selfregulatory bodies have a different, partly morally motivated background,158
their ever-growing appeal may reveal shifts in moral preferences that cannot
be overlooked. Therefore, it appears opportune that ISO expands its agenda
and, by implication, the interests represented at the standard-setting table in
view of its dominant position in this area of transnational rule-making.159
Excluded voices within ISO will most likely default if they see that chances
of being heard are low. In such cases, they will look for other opportunities
to fill what they perceive as a lacuna in international standard-setting
matters.160
B. Reviewing ISO Practices Against the Principles of the TBT Committee
Decision
Respect of the TBT principles on the development of international
standards may have the same result. Interestingly, the ISO Code of Conduct
adheres strictly to the six TBT principles:161 transparency; openness;
impartiality and consensus; effectiveness and relevance; coherence; and the
“development dimension” (that is, as noted earlier, the requirement to
address the concerns of developing countries) figure prominently in the
ISO’s Code of Conduct. These principles have been upgraded to become

155. Participation, however, has been unequally distributed, with industry and governments together
appointing about half of the experts in the Working Group. See Bart Slob & Gerard Oonk, The ISO
Working Group on Social Responsibility: Developing the Future ISO SR 26000 Standard, SOMO
Briefing Paper, Mar. 2007, at 2.
156. G.A.P. stands for good agricultural practice. See Hachez & Wouters supra note 78, at 679.
157. See Panagiotis Delimatsis, Sustainable standard-setting, climate change and the TBT
Agreement, in THE RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE LAW (Panagiotis
Delimatsis ed., 2016), 148.
158. Cf. David P. Baron, Morally Motivated Self-Regulation, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1299, 1299
(2010).
159. See generally, Richard B. Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance:
Accountability, Participation, and Responsiveness, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 211 (2014).
160. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
161. See ISO Code of Conduct supra note 150150.
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“the key principles of international standardization.”162 Thus, not only are
the TBT principles endorsed by ISO, but they have also allegedly become
guiding principles for its technical work.163
If this is a correct assumption, then no proper interpretation of these
principles can take place without reference to the initial source document of
these principles, which is the TBT Committee Decision.164 In other words,
these principles do not have an ISO-specific meaning, but rather a WTO
meaning, as elaborated in the TBT Committee Decision of 2000, subsequent
meetings of the TBT Committee (e.g., the triennial reviews of the TBT
Agreement) and as spelled out in the Panel and Appellate Body rulings such
as the US—Tuna II ruling or future WTO disputes on TBT matters.165 The
successful achievement of the trade-enabling objectives of the TBT
agreement passes through the development of international standards, which
in turn raises the bar as to due process expectations within ISSBs.166
With respect to the first two principles, the Decision is indicative of
WTO Members’ intent to ensure that the development of international
standards takes place transparently and through wide participation.
With regards to transparency, the TBT Committee Decision requires
that adequate time and opportunities be provided for written comments. In
addition, the Decision appears to require dissemination of relevant
information to all members of the standard-setting body early in the
standard-setting process, much earlier than the current ISO procedures
would provide. When this principle is assessed against the ISO practices,
there seems to be room for major improvements in the ISO mechanics.
In the first reaction by ISO to the TBT Committee Decision, ISO turned
a deaf ear to the requirement of transparency as enunciated in the Decision.
It recalled its decentralized nature to claim that it is for ISO member bodies

162. Id. at 4.
163. Note that ISO has an observer status at the TBT Committee and regularly informs the
Committee of its activities and plans.
164. See WTO, TBT Committee, supra note 39.
165. The TBT Committee Decision appears to reflect WTO Members’ prevailing normative view as
to standards development. In the current NAMA negotiations, the Decision has informed Members’
positions regarding the definition of international standards and the traits of ISSBs. See WTO, Negotiating
Group on Market Access, ‘Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products – International Standardisation’,
Communication from the European Union, India, Indonesia, Norway, Philippines, Switzerland and
Thailand, WTO Doc. TN/MA/W/142, 13 April 2011.
166. See US – Tuna II, supra note 1817, at n.745 (“WTO Members see representative participation
and the observance of due process in the development of international standards as essential to the
achievement of the trade facilitating objectives of the TBT Agreement.”).
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to inform domestic constituents,167 thereby neglecting the importance of
direct communication and information channels that should be in place in
view of the normative power that ISO has gained in the last two decades and
the increasingly prominent role that it plays in international economic
governance as a key trade-enabling institution.
Admittedly, ISO’s move towards a more assertive role in international
matters is slow. To date, ISO’s approach vis-à-vis transparency and
participation seems to be based on the publication of guides addressed to the
national standard-setting bodies calling for more effective communication
channels and dissemination of ISO’s work at the national level, as well as
for the adoption of an inclusive multi-stakeholder philosophy when
establishing the national stance on a given subject discussed within ISO. It
is doubtful at best whether this approach would be regarded as consistent
with the TBT Committee Decision if it were put to test before the WTO
judiciary.
With respect to openness, the Decision requires the existence of
meaningful opportunities for participation at all stages of standards
development.168 According to ISO, it is for ISO members to assess their
technical capacity and accordingly decide their membership status (O-, P-,
subscriber or correspondent membership). While ISO is probably right to
argue that “it is neither effective nor efficient to have all developing countries
participate in all standard-setting activities at the international level,”169 there
is a clear imbalance in the distribution of technical work and leadership tasks
within ISO, which obviously mirrors decades of knowledge acquisition on
the side of developed countries.
While it is indeed sensible to encourage developing countries to
organize themselves at the regional level hoping for better representation at
the ISO level, schemes and mechanisms that would offer direct access to ISO
standardization activities are necessary. The mechanism of twinning can
only be considered as a necessary but insufficient instrument towards more
effective participation. In addition, effective participation implies a
significantly costly endeavor: absent financial means directed towards
facilitating more regular participation by a broad ISO membership base,
much of the work within TCs is dominated by industry-driven developed

167. See ISO/IEC Directives, supra note 96, at cl. 1.7.1.; see also WTO, TBT Committee, supra
note 39, at para. 6. After more than ten years, ISO’s approach on the matter remained unchanged. See
WTO, TBT Committee, ‘ISO and IEC Comments on India’s Submission on International Standard (IS)
Setting’, WTO Doc. G/TBT/GEN/129, Apr. 2, 2012, at para. 5.
168. See US Tuna–II, supra note18, at ¶ 369ff, at 142.
169. See WTO, TBT Committee, supra note39, at ¶ 6.
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country interests which have the necessary financial means to hold
convenerships or TCs.170 Such embedded practices have led certain scholars
to talk of transnational corporate domination171 of the process of drafting
standards. This phenomenon may be worrisome in terms of fairness and
participation, but, more fundamentally, of legitimacy.
The Decision further clarifies the importance of impartiality and
consensus-building in ISSBs. Whereas it underlines the importance of
meaningful opportunities to contribute to the elaboration of an international
standard so that the entire process does not tilt towards the preferences of the
few, it is more accommodating with respect to consensus, acknowledging
indirectly that a decision-making system that takes into account the views of
all parties concerned and seeks to reconcile conflicting arguments can meet
the requirement enshrined in the Decision. Thus, the ISO’s double consensus
(as noted earlier, two-thirds rule within the TC and 75% of the votes cast)
seems to meet the requirement of consensus within the Decision.
Recently, it was proposed that ISSBs follow the WTO consensus rule
(a negative vote would amount to a veto right) or increase the threshold for
adoption.172 ISO was not in favor of changing a decision-making system in
which objections were a rare phenomenon. Within the WTO, the idea of
raising the threshold does not seem to gather sufficient support, all the more
because the underlying rationale is everything but clear. Rather, WTO
Members seem to agree that, more fundamentally, it is about arguments
rather than votes. Therefore, setting minimum benchmarks for consensus
would be rather pointless.173 One can only agree with this observation:
raising the minimum percentage of consensus would leave the problem of
varying and unbalanced expertise within the ISO community intact.
Opposing voices would still need to refer to technical reasons to challenge
any given standard—and for that, a sophisticated level of capacity-building
and ensuing expertise would be warranted.
A further source of future concern for ISO may potentially be an
observation by the Appellate Body in US—Tuna II made in passu. As noted
170. See also ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 68, at 267.
171. Id.
172. India suggested that this threshold cannot be lower than 90%. See WTO, TBT Committee,
Principles of International Standard Setting, WTO Doc. G/TBT/W/345 (Nov. 10, 2011), at 2.
173. See the discussion within the TBT Committee in WTO, TBT Committee, Minutes of the
meeting of 10-11 November 2011, WTO Doc. G/TBT/M/55 (Feb. 2, 2012), at ¶ 285ff,
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=
89001,43462,51482,89194,92796,80305,97330,86176,98233,60846&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=1&Full
TextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True
[https://perma.cc/LTM3-KL8X].
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earlier, the US argued that AIDCP, the standard suggested by Mexico, was
not a relevant international standard for various reasons, including because
it did not allow for the participation of consumer and conservation interests
in its standard-related activities.174 Arguably, for the resolution of the
dispute, it was immaterial whether the Appellate Body ruled on that claim.
Astonishingly, the Appellate Body decided to go on and answer the US
claim. Without any meticulous analysis, it agreed that an international body
must not privilege any particular interests when developing international
standards. The Appellate Body premised its finding on the heading of the
TBT Committee Decision relating to impartiality and consensus.175
However, a proper interpretation of that particular heading and of the
previous drafts reveals that Members were unwilling to broaden so
extensively the circle of relevant entities participating in the standards
development process. Rather, the Members were concerned with the very
effective access of their national or local standard-setting bodies to
international standardization. Consumer associations or preservation-related
NGOs did not seem to be within the circle of participants in the standardsetting processes that the WTO Members envisaged when adopting the TBT
Committee Decision.
Thus, whereas the Appellate Body erred in this particular regard, a
further confirmation of this finding in a future WTO dispute will be
problematic for ISO. While generally open, as noted earlier, the ISO still
does not allow such a great variety of interests to participate in the ISO
processes. The constitution and function of COPOLCO (discussed earlier)
illustrates this point quite powerfully. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why
we witness the emergence of alternative standard-setting bodies such as the
ISEAL Alliance or GlobalG.A.P., where such interests find expression and
can voice their concerns and interests. Accordingly, this finding by the
Appellate Body may open the door for more diversity within the ISO in the
medium run.
Effectiveness and relevance is the fourth principle set out in the
Decision, which requires that ISSBs (1) take into account relevant regulatory
or market needs, and scientific and technological developments in the
elaboration of standards; (2) put in place procedures aimed at identifying and
reviewing standards that have become obsolete, inappropriate or ineffective;
and (3) establish or maintain communication channels with the WTO.
Regarding market relevance vis-à-vis a specific work item, the Directives
include an important set of substantive guarantees to ensure the market

174. See supra US – Tuna II, note 18, at ¶ 383.
175. Id. ¶ 384.
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relevance of new proposals for standards development. As mentioned earlier,
the burden of proof lies with the P-member that proposes new work. The ISO
TMB had established a global relevance policy as early as in 2003, worried
that its relevance for TBT purposes may be questioned. Interestingly, the
Directives suggest that the adoption of the TBT “placed an obligation on ISO
to ensure that the International Standards [sic] it develops, adopts and
publishes are globally relevant.” (Emphasis added).176 The TMB understands
what is at stake: a standard failing to meet the requirements of the TBT
Committee Decision may be challenged as creating a barrier to trade.
Global relevance is defined within ISO as “required characteristics of
an International Standard that it can be used/implemented as broadly as
possible by affected industries and other stakeholders in markets around the
world.”177 As the intent is to capture and accommodate market dynamics
through ISO standard-setting, regional or national differences would not
normally be taken further unless they are essential (e.g., related to climate
differences, anthropometry, or embedded technological infrastructures) and
thus are typically not subject to change and adaptation. Where such concerns
are present, the ISO approach on introducing a unique international solution
through standard-setting would not hold; rather, these concerns would need
to be addressed.
Again, within ISO, it is for the TC, and more specifically, the PMembers, to examine and confirm the global relevance of a given (new)
work item and raise any essential differences that should be included in the
standards. The latter should be presented to the other P-members of the
relevant TC for approval as early as possible and at the latest at the
Committee draft stage.178 Provided that essential differences eventually form
part of the draft international standard, negative votes cannot be premised
solely on the fact of such an inclusion.
As noted earlier, there do not seem to be any compelling reasons for
limiting to P-members the right of raising essential differences. Furthermore,
there is no review mechanism regarding the approval (or not) of such
176. ISO/IEC Directives, supra note 96, at annex SM.1. The Annex reproduces the document on
ISO/TMB Policy and Principles Statement – Global Relevance of ISO Technical Work and Publications.
It reiterates the list of substantive criteria that determine the global relevance of a given standard to be
found in the TBT Committee Decision (effectively respond to regulatory and market needs; respond to
scientific and technical developments in various countries; not hinder fair competition or innovation; and
be performance-based).
177. Id. annex SM.2.
178. See ISO/TMB Implementation Guidance – Global Relevance of ISO Technical Work and
Publications, at 10, annex 2 (2004), http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_tmb_implementation_guidance_global_
relevance.pdf [https://perma.cc/ U5MM-4892] (last visited on Feb. 18, 2017).
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requests within a given TC (other than the general appeal mechanism within
ISO, the use of which is, again, largely limited to P-members). The TMB
does not seem to play any immediate role here as a more neutral control
mechanism.179 Indeed, depending on the dynamics within a TC, undermining
the importance of essential differences raised may be the prevailing stance:
intuitively, most P-members would have no incentive to create loopholes
within a given standard. Increased compliance costs or delays in finalizing
the Committee draft may be some of the reasons that would justify such an
opposition by P-members within a TC.
At the post-adoption stage, ISO includes a review mechanism of
standards and technical specifications. However, a systematic impact
assessment instrument does not form part of the ISO standard-setting system.
Nor is such a requirement imposed by the TBT Committee Decision.
However, the possibility of including such a requirement was proposed as a
useful tool to ensure the continuous relevance and efficacy of a given
standard.180 For instance, competing SSBs such as the ISEAL Alliance
adopted an Impacts Code that requires the assessment of repercussions on
various fields both during the drafting and after the adoption of ISEAL
sustainability standards.
The fifth principle of the Decision is coherence, which, pursuant to the
Decision, points to the need for cooperation and coordination with other
relevant ISSBs to avoid duplication or overlap. Thus, the concept of
coherence does not refer here to the standards and standard-setting processes
within a single ISSB, but rather the appropriate relationship among
institutions with similar functions. ISO has such mechanisms in place, at
least with respect to IEC at the international level,181 but also CEN at the
regional level.182
179. See id. at 3–4. The document suggests that, in case of doubt and absent a resolution of the
concern at the TC level, the TMB may be asked to review the details to provide advice/direction to the
relevant TC. However, this is an informal, conciliatory role that the TMB may play with no reference as
to when and how the TMB will indeed intervene.
180. See TBT Committee, Principles of International Standard Setting, supra note 172, at 3.
181. Annex B of the ISO/IEC Directives suggests that ISO and IEC together form a system for
international standardization as a whole. Indeed, these two ISSBs account for about 85% of international
product standards. See Tim Büthe, Engineering Uncontestedness? The Origins and Institutional
Development of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), 12 BUS. & POL. 1, 5 (2010). Annex
B describes precisely how work is allocated and liaison works between the two institutions. For the most
sensitive, unresolved questions of coordination and work allocation the ISO/IEC Joint Technical
Advisory Board may be consulted.
182. See The Agreement on Technical Cooperation Between ISO and CEN (Vienna Agreement), ¶
5 (1991), http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/2000/2122/3146825/4229629/4230450/4230458/
01__Agreement_on_Technical_Cooperation_between_ISO_and_CEN_(Vienna_Agreement).pdf?nodei
d=4230688&vernum=-2 [https://perma.cc/3R3R-MD66]. This Agreement becomes operational through
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The Vienna Agreement and the subsequently adopted guidelines are
monitored by the Joint Co-ordination group of the TMB and the CEN
Technical Board (CEN/BT) and entail two options for collaborative
standard-setting: the ISO lead and the CEN lead. Thus, while recognizing
the primacy of international standards, this cooperation agreement results in
the CEN becoming a decentralized agent (and preferred strategic partner) for
the development of new standards. The Guidelines provide that, if the
expected results are not achieved, ISO or CEN can proceed separately in the
development of standards. In addition, when the CEN lead is opted for (and
for this a simple majority of the non-CEN P-Members of the ISO TC is
required), CEN should ensure the due process rights of non-CEN ISO
members (for instance, by adequately responding to their comments). Under
certain circumstances, and regardless of whether ISO or CEN were the lead
organization, a decision may be reached to approve a given standard within
ISO and CEN in parallel.
The last principle that the Decision identifies is addressing the concerns
of developing countries. The Decision recognizes the challenges of ensuring
effective participation in international standard-setting that these countries
have diachronically faced. Notably, the Decision requires that “tangible”
ways of effective participation of developing countries must be sought.
However, arguably in line with the soft, hortatory for the most part, language
that is used in the WTO provisions relating to special and differential
treatment for developing countries, the Decision defines this requirement in
a negative manner in that it requires no de facto exclusion from the
standardization processes within the relevant ISSB.
As noted earlier, ISO has developed an action plan for developing
countries for the period of 2016-2020. This is the third five-year action plan
adopted by ISO, which succeeded the triennial programs adopted in the
previous decade.183 DEVCO monitors the proper execution of the action
plan. Nevertheless, the structure of DEVCO may not be the most adequate
one for accommodating developing countries’ concerns.184 The current
action plan entails a targeted approach with five intended “outcomes,”
including increased participation in the technical work. The plan, however,
remains relatively vague in several instances, whereas under certain outputs,
it appears that the language used is hortatory.
the Guidelines for the implementation of the Agreement on Technical Cooperation between ISO and CEN
(the Vienna Agreement), 6th ed., January 2014.
183. The execution of the action plan is among the key priorities of the ISO Strategic Plan 20162020. See ISO Strategy 2016-2020, 2015, at https://www.iso.org/files/live/sites/isoorg/files/archive/
pdf/en/iso_strategy_2016-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NPL-AL4U].
184. Recall that many developing countries are only O-members in DEVCO, which undermines
their chances for meaningful participation and influence.
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Under these circumstances surrounding developing country
participation, the direction that the action plan takes, even if unsatisfactory,
appears eventually to be the correct one: actions for the strengthening of
domestic standardization (including deliberation and multi-stakeholder input
gathering or reinforcing the national quality infrastructure) processes are
coupled with actions within ISO, most prominently the twinning program.
However, measuring performance at the end of each action plan is a
prerequisite for identifying tangible benefits in drawing regular action plans
of this type.
Twinning can be more effective than many other technical assistance
initiatives designed within the ISO Committee on developing country
matters (DEVCO). However, there are some worrisome signs relating to this
initiative: a recent survey showed that more than fifty percent of these
agreements are informal despite the existence of an ISO template.185 It also
showed that the main beneficiaries of such agreements were the Chinese (23
agreements) and Brazilian (9 agreements) SSBs (as of September 2013).186
While not perfect, twinning is a very promising instrument that may
force changes in perceptions and reforms in the domestic SSBs involved. It
can lead to more serious efforts for mutual understanding, respect, and
eventually trust. It is quite telling that ISO national standards bodies from
developing countries largely remain governmental agencies, whereas one
would expect that private and multi-stakeholder participation leads to a
hybrid form of representation, acknowledging the fact that, in most cases,
technical knowledge and know-how is vested with private, industry-driven
actors. Twinning may instigate reflection and expeditious action towards the
creation of more efficient structures with a view to becoming more eloquent,
outspoken, and confident at the ISO level. This will be beneficial for the ISO
as well because more voices may raise fundamental issues of relevance for
certain standards (for instance, due to important regional needs and
peculiarities). Finally, one cannot emphasize enough the importance of
increasing mutual trust and enduring professional relationships among
participants in the international standardization process.
All in all, even if the approach vis-à-vis developing countries’
participation as expressed in the current Action Plan appears to go in the
right direction at first blush, no systematic and rigorous review of the impact
185. To assist in striking such agreements, ISO has prepared a twinning agreement template:
Twinning Agreement template, www.iso.org/iso/twinning_agreement_template.doc (last visited Feb. 15,
2017).
186. The study was conducted by the Japanese Standards Association, available at:
https://www.jsa.or.jp/datas/media/10000/md_1186.pdf.
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of such programs and plans (for instance, the ISO Action Plan 2005-2010)
seems to have taken place to date.187 In addition, previous initiatives such as
the Forum on Standards Actions in the Global Market (SGM Forum) had
mixed results.
The above analysis suggests that, although far from being flawless, the
ISO efforts to address standards development-related developing country
concerns are going in the right direction, in view of the organization’s
diachronic structural bias towards the most advanced global standard-setters,
that is, the traditional players from developed countries. ISO has made good
faith efforts to become more inclusive, but the need for reform is not limited
at the ISO level; rather, effective participation is also a function of the level
of—and determination for—reforms domestically. In other words, no
change in effective participation levels will occur without empowerment of
domestic standards development bodies and guarantees for respect of due
process rights of stakeholders at the domestic level. It is no coincidence that
ISO insists on the six principles being respected not only by TCs at the ISO
level, but also by national standards bodies, notably those of openness,
transparency, and impartiality.
Overall, ISO activities and processes appear to be guided to a large
extent by the six principles enshrined in the TBT Committee Decision, but
full compliance cannot be claimed as of yet. It appears that a more thorough
review of ISO practices against the principles of the TBT Committee
Decision will most likely trigger a reform of standard-setting practices and
should be expected to lead to a new approach in transnational standardsetting. Standard-setting 2.0 is bound to happen, as voices for more openness
and inclusiveness from those hardly involved to date and other international
organizations sharing similar objectives, such as the WTO, multiply.
A remaining interpretive issue of systemic importance is whether
failure to comply with one of the TBT principles may be sufficient to
question ISO’s compliance with the TBT Committee Decision and thus
jeopardize the relevance of ISO’s standards for WTO purposes. In other
words, is the adherence to all principles a precondition for a given ISSB to
receive TBT clearance in accordance with Article 2.4 TBT or would a more
holistic inquiring exercise of the ISSB’s overall activities and procedures
have to take place, balancing all existing evidence? In US—Tuna II, the
Appellate Body did not seem to exclude the latter possibility, as it observed
that “to the extent that a standardizing body complies with the principles and
187. DEVCO appears to be sending questionnaires to beneficiaries of activities implemented under
the current Action Plan to assess their impact but it is unclear how these feed into the subsequent action
plans. See DEVCO 47th meeting – Working Documents, St. Petersburg, Sep. 16-17, 2013, at 40.
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procedures that WTO Members have decided ‘should be observed’ in the
development of international standards, it would be easier to find that the
body has ‘recognized activities in standardization.’”188
A proper reading of the Appellate Body’s approach suggests that no
mechanical analysis of compliance of ISO (or, indeed, of any ISSB at issue)
with the six principles of the TBT Committee Decision would be opted for.
Rather, a broad assessment of the practices of the relevant ISSB would be
made, along with an analysis of the procedures that led to the adoption of the
standard at hand before a final decision can be reached as to the relevance of
such a standard for TBT purposes.
Taking ISO as an example, then, the WTO adjudicating bodies would
have a dual mission: first, to examine whether ISO practices comply with the
Decision in general, and, second, whether the Decision was respected when
the specific ISO standard at issue was adopted. This would be the direct
implication and natural consequence of the fact that, as submitted earlier, the
characteristics of the process followed for the eventual adoption of a given
ISO standard affect the ultimate authority and value of that standard.
V.

CONCLUSION

International standardization is key for economic growth and
innovation. In addition, economic evidence suggests that standardization has
contributed to trade much more than any trade agreement could ever have.189
ISSBs constitute a forum that fosters the competition of ideas, whereby one
of them (or a combination thereof) will become the reference point for
production processes and methods globally. Technical merit and noneconomic considerations battle for relevance, whereas the relevant SSBs try
to ensure their smooth functioning. As such, clashes of conflicting values
can easily lead to a paralysis of their activities. It is important to acknowledge
that ISO has no easy mix of tasks to execute in this respect, pending between
identification of technical superiority and guaranteeing openness and
transparency.
When it comes to procedural and substantive safeguards in global
institutions, setting the bar too high may be misleading, as it does not capture
the idiosyncrasies of hybrid, voluntary-based institutions active at the
transnational level.190 Rather, ensuring a fair representation of a wide array
of affected interests in the standard-setting process should be the objective
188. See US – Tuna II supra note 18 at, ¶376, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R (adopted May 16, 2012).
189. See Daniel Bernhofen, Zouheir El-Sahli & Richard Kneller, Estimating the Effects of the
Container Revolution on World Trade, 98 J. INT’L ECON. 36, 46 (2016).
190. See Andrew Moravcsik, Is There a “Democratic Deficit” in World Politics? A Framework for
Analysis, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 336 , 337 (2004).
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of any transnational rule-maker. At the institutional level, responsive statutes
and internal regulations should be in place, allowing for adjustments when
needed and ex post control.
Technocratic legitimacy may not be sufficient to discharge ISO of the
obligations that it has as the global leader in standard-setting. As described
earlier, ISO has undertaken serious good faith efforts to address complaints
regarding its standard-setting processes; notably with respect to
participation, relevance, and coherence. Its observer status at the TBT
Committee also helped gauge the pulse of those WTO Members—
developing countries for the most part—who believe that access to ISO
standard-setting is still intractable.
The world of voluntary standards has evolved to affect more parties
globally than initially expected. The early immunity that it enjoyed at the
international level due to its non-public nature has eroded after the
“multilateralization” of the TBT Agreement. The voluntary character of
standards remained, but the advent of the WTO changed the impact of
international standards for good. Regulatory convergence and reduction of
non-tariff barriers would now pass through the adoption of these standards,
which were regarded as authoritative expressions of technical excellence
internationally. Indeed, the TBT took an orthodox view vis-à-vis
international standards: standards improve product efficiency and facilitate
trade, notably when adopted at the international level, as compliance costs
are reduced. Therefore, adherence to international standards becomes a
necessary condition for the very attainment of the TBT objectives.
Importantly, no grandfathering would be accepted: as established by the
WTO Appellate Body in EC—Sardines, even standards adopted before the
creation of the WTO would be considered to assess the consistency of the
regulatory instruments of a given WTO member with the TBT. Noncompliance with these mandatory benchmarks for domestic technical
regulations would raise suspicions as to the good intentions of governmental
intervention.
The ISO and the WTO run parallel lives and pursue similar missions
focusing on improving market access in a cost-effective manner. The
emergence of new players in the international scene seeking to shape rulemaking in international affairs more actively has played no less a significant
role in increasing the impact of international standard-setting. Previously run
in essence by the developed world, the international standardization
community attracted the interest of an ever-increasing number of parties and
thus had to become more inclusive without, however, putting into jeopardy
its effectiveness with respect to consolidating technological advances.
Admittedly, no empowerment of new ISO members is possible without
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effective participation. Therefore, strengthening procedural rights is the
gateway to more inclusive and representative international standards. In turn,
only higher levels of participation can reduce the knowledge gap between
developed and developing countries.
This much-needed reform in ISSBs and the ISO has been the result of
developments within the TBT Committee, most notably the adoption of the
TBT Committee Decision in 2000. Analysis of this Decision and its potential
impact has been surprisingly scarce to date. It is the first time in the WTO
that the delegation of regulatory power to ISSBs was made conditional upon
adherence to a series of principles, mainly of procedural due process in
nature. This Decision was vested with substantial legal value through the
US—Tuna II ruling, showing the potential “bite” of WTO adjudication as an
ex post legitimating device for international standardization: output by
standards organizations will be critically reviewed and perhaps discarded if
it fails to satisfy the principles set out in the Decision. The principles are
quite demanding and few ISSBs would manage to meet each one of them
and in a cumulative manner.191
Discussion of ISO standards has been a rare phenomenon in WTO
adjudication.192 One reason for this may be that WTO Members consider ISO
to function relatively well, in a transparent, open, and efficient manner.
However, as suggested in this article, closer scrutiny of ISO may prove
otherwise. Using the example of ISO, this article critically reviewed the
procedural and substantive guarantees that are in place to ensure that
international standards adopted in international standardization fora are in
line with basic tenets of due process or transparency. One of the most
powerful findings of this article is that the reform of ISO processes has not
come full circle yet; on the contrary, ample room for improvement exists.
ISO has several steps to take to align with the telos of the TBT Committee
Decision but also with contemporary demands relating to global governance
institutions.
The US—Tuna II ruling can potentially herald a new era of international
co-operation in international standard-setting based on solid grounds relating
to due process, consultation, reasoned regulatory-making, inclusion, and
technical excellence, particularly in light of the Appellate Body’s findings.
At the same time, US—Tuna II was confined to a discussion of practices and
institutional structures of a regional SSB, whereas it discussed shortly only
191. See also Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by
Judiciary, 27:1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 56 (2016).
192. Only a few WTO Panel Reports have touched upon specific ISO standards. See, e.g., Panel
Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, WTO
Doc. WT/DS135/R (Sep. 18, 2000).
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one of the six principles identified in the TBT Committee Decision. Thus,
nothing would prejudge the outcome of a dispute in which an ISO standard
would be at issue.
This article, however, argued that the WTO adjudicating bodies will be
no less willing to critically review the ISO standard-setting processes. This
is also in line with a more critical view of international standard-setting, this
time by the multilateral trading regime qua a parallel horizontal system.
Evidence about insufficiently inclusive and open procedures throws shade
against ISSBs and the ISO is no exception. Current discussions in NAMA
negotiations only exemplify this discontent. And, while the present stalemate
in the WTO negotiations may lead some to argue against the relevance of the
views expressed within the WTO, it is submitted that essentially similar
views are to be found in the negotiating texts of preferential trade
agreements, so-called “mega-regionals” such as the TTIP193 or the TransPacific Partnership (TPP).194
Such a critical view of international standardization activities is a
welcome development if it leads to an era of more representative
international standards. It is also indicative of a broader trend by public
authorities to guarantee the importance of due process rights of all
stakeholders in standard-setting activities.195 However, it is argued that a new
conceptual framework is needed to inform the development of international
standards in ISSBs. This new framework will inevitably build on the TBT
Committee Decision, but shall also include other criteria relating to
sustainability196 and inter-institutional sensitivity as well as cooperation with
relevant international organizations and NGOs. Depending on the subjectmatter (for instance, to ensure that a given standard also is in line with

193. See the EU’s textual proposal for a chapter on technical barriers to trade, Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership art. 6:3 (made public on January 7, 2015).
194. The TPP text is even more explicit than the EU’s proposal under the TTIP, calling for the use
of the TBT Committee Decision regarding international standards. See final text of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, Chapter 8 (Technical Barriers to Trade), art. 8.5. Despite the US withdrawal from the deal,
the remaining TPP members will soon meet to see the prospects for implementing the deal among them.
195. Failure to protect such rights within SSBs may lead to anti-competitive behavior. See,
Communication from the European Commission, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements, [2011] O.J.
C 11/01, paras 280ff; US National Cooperative and Production Act (NCRPA), 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(8).
Early on, the US Supreme Court underlined the importance of procedural safeguards within SSBs. See
Allied Tube v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 500, 501 (1988).
196. ISO has recently published guidelines addressing sustainability in standards development. The
guidelines are intended to encourage the examination of issues relating to sustainability during all stages of
standards development within ISO. Importantly, the guidelines provide that the lack of considering
sustainability issues in the development of a given standard can validly justify the revision of that standard
and call for the involvement of knowledgeable experts in such a revision: See ISO Guide 82:2014.
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pertinent labor or human rights), consumers and trade unions shall also be
involved.
Indeed, from a normative point of view, for a standard to be regarded as
a genuinely international standard, additional, but at the same time more
concrete, criteria would need to be developed. ISO seems to be laser focused
on output legitimacy, which is a fairly appealing approach for an organization
dealing with technical standards. However, input legitimacy (allowing
interested parties to be heard at an early stage in the process), early notification
procedures, and appropriate mechanisms for review that are easy to understand
and use should be inextricably associated with the functioning of any
organization that aspires to be a meta-regulator of technical matters at the
international level. At the post-adoption stage, systematic impact assessment
should be in place, allowing any ISO member to raise the need for revision.
Additionally, in line with the dual character of ISO’s mission (that is,
technical and political), scientific rigor, relevance, and technical excellence
cannot be left outside any analysis as to the international character of a given
standard. Furthermore, ISO has yet to make decisive steps towards more
openness vis-à-vis the public. Information on standard-setting processes and
on disciplinary cases or appeals is not readily available. This undue secrecy
may harm the public image of ISO. Interestingly, even non-technical
information produced by ISO such as guides or recommendations of a nontechnical nature are only available with a fee.
To be sure, ISO’s business model, which is based on copyright protection
and charging a fee for full access to the text of a standard, has been criticized
because its application to standards referenced in legislation defies any notion
of public openness and transparency.197 However, ISO could soften some of
this criticism by offering access to non-technical documents such as guides or
recommendations, all the more because many of them are made available by
national SSBs.198
197. In a recent case that discussed the question of copyright for model building codes incorporated
in legislation, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit drew a line vis-à-vis standards created by
SSBs suggesting that the latter are not created for the sole purpose of being used in binding legislation.
Rather, the relevant public authorities later decide to refer to such standards in their legislation, i.e.
incorporate them by reference. The Court seemed to favor the existence of copyright protection in such
cases although it denied such protection to the model codes at issue which were created with the sole
purpose of becoming part of legislation, which then should exclude their copyrightability. See Veeck v
Southern Building Code Congress Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 804−05 (5th Cir. 2002)(en banc).
198. In the EU, the issue of access to the text of standards referenced in EU legislation (so-called
‘harmonized standards’) is at the epicentre of the reform of the EU standardization processes also due to
jurisprudential developments. In the recent Elliott case, the CJEU found that EU harmonized standards
form part of EU law, opening the door for judicial action against the substantive content of standards but
also against any denial by SSBs of access to these documents. See Case C-613/14, James Elliott Constr.
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Finally, ISO also has an educational mission to accomplish that has often
been neglected. The scratch line is not the same for all ISO members and this
shows already in the distribution of technical work within ISO. Only by
reducing the knowledge gap between ISO members can one hope for the
creation of standards that largely reflect global preferences. This is a matter of
political will and heavy investment: DEVCO regularly raises funding in ISO
meetings but urges the most sophisticated members to increase their efforts
and ensuing investment. It is a matter of fairness, but also a strategic matter for
ISO: what would happen if the newly emerging economies which start having
significant monopsony power experiment with the creation of their own
standards that diverge from ISO standards, based on arguments of effective
exclusion within ISO? This could have undesirable consequences for all ISO
members and everyday business and trade. Further research on the functioning
of ISSBs would be necessary to shed light on best practices and policies as
well as procedural deficiencies that perpetuate an unbalanced standard-setting
landscape at the international level.

Ltd. V. Irish Asphalt Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2016:821, paras. 38−43 (2016); see also, Case C-630/16, Anstar,
ECLI:EU:C:2017:971, para. 32 (2017).

